關於 elections under authoritarianism ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

#國際戰線【黃之鋒x鄺頌晴｜投稿《華盛頓郵報》：北京立法宣告「一國兩制」死亡】

Oped of Joshua Wong & Glacier Kwong in Washington Post: This is the final nail in the coffin for Hong Kong’s autonomy (Scroll down for English)

《港版國安法》從醞釀到正式宣佈，至今只是不夠一個星期的時間，形勢相當緊迫與嚴峻，爭取國際盟友反對惡法已是爭分奪秒的事情。當路透社報道白宮消息人士表明考慮制裁，當下國際戰線手足必然會推波助瀾，我亦繼昨晚在英國《獨立報》發表文章後，與鄺頌晴在《華盛頓郵報》發表文章，爭取西方政界關注，切實執行對香港官員制裁。

同時，有幾句說話想講。

就係想多謝俾我拖咗落水一齊寫文夾專欄嘅鄺頌晴，要知道自從國安法宣佈左之後，呢個唔知有冇追溯期嘅惡法，根本就能夠隨時以言入罪，分分鐘呢篇外媒投稿文章，都能夠成為所謂叛國或者顛覆國家嘅證據。

無錯，國際戰線嘅成本係提高左唔少，但家陣香港都去到存亡號召嘅境地，別無他選都只能夠頂硬上。所以，無論有無同我合作，取態定位一唔一樣，甚至我認唔認識都好，依家仲會開樣開名，所謂「喺枱面上」嘅國際戰線手足，希望大家都可以俾多啲鼓勵佢哋每一位。

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/24/this-is-final-nail-coffin-hong-kongs-autonomy/

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中國全國人民代表大會（全國人大）公布了一份與香港《國安法》相關的決定草案，聲稱有關草案可以「建立健全的法律制度和執行機制」，以及「維護香港特別行政區的國家安全」。一旦通過，此決定草案將授權全國人大常委會，在完全繞過香港本地立法程序的情況下，直接在香港實施惡法。字面上，《國安法》的目的是禁止任何分裂國家丶顛覆國家政權丶恐怖活動以及境外勢力干預香港事務的活動。然而，此舉實為香港本已千瘡百孔丶極度脆弱的「高度自治」以及公民自由再添上致命的一擊。

2003年，香港政府意圖以本地立法程序，強推與《國安法》性質相近的23條時，遭到廣泛社會強烈反對，因而宣佈撤回方案。在如此具爭議性的議案面前，暴露了香港政府欠缺民主荃礎。十多年後，香港政府及中央政府的正當性在2019年的反修例運動當中，再次面對挑戰。

然而，正當國際社會忙於對抗疫情，北京卻藉此機會對香港的自治作出一連串的打壓。它先是將中聯辦對香港的「監督權」制度化，現在全國人大更是繞過香港立法會的立法程序，將港版《國安法》直接放在《基本法》附件三，稍後由香港政府公布實施。

香港2019年的運動得以持續多時，有賴三條不同的戰線：街頭抗爭丶議會選舉以及國際遊說的工作。北京以「國家安全」為名，引入一系列的法律條文，一方面藉此取得不受制約的權力，任意打壓示威者以及選舉候選人，另一方面則可以隔絕香港與國際社會之間的連結，阻撓外界對香港的支持。

與此同時，北京已經進一步加強在港的政治宣傳工作，不管示威和平與否，多次指是「本土恐怖主義」抬頭。這亦意味著，於接下來的日子，示威者會極易墮入新《國安法》的規管，並且面對更嚴苛的法律制裁。令人更為擔憂的是，這條法案亦表明針對境外勢力「干預香港事務」。這意味著，不論是議員或抗爭者，單單因為曾經參與國際遊說工作，就可能會被剝奪參選的資格，甚至面臨監禁。而國際非政府組織（INGOs）以及其他組織丶團體，他們的員工以及資產均可能遭受法律清算。

在沒有一個妥當、民意基礎的立法程序下，定義含糊的法律用詞像「分裂國家」以及「顛覆國家」極易會被用作打壓、迫害的工具，侵害我們與生俱來的自由和權利，包括言論自由、集會自由以及宗教自由。所有對於中國以及香港政府的批評，甚至只是支持香港運動的聲音，極有可能被視為分裂或顛覆國家的行為，受到法律制裁。這種寒蟬效將會持續發酵，城內將會出現大量的自我審查，而這種審查勢將蔓延至國際社會。

香港的自由─不論是她作為國際金融中心的角色，還是她充滿生命力的公民社會─都關係到國際社會的利益。再者，基本法所承諾的「一國兩制」丶「高度自治」以及普選，本就得到國際法下所簽訂的《中英聯合聲明》認可。是次中央政府自上而下推行的《國安法》已經不只是香港的本地事務，更是對國際社會的威嚇，讓其噤聲。

一直以來，香港是異見者丶思想破格的人以及革新者的容身之所。縱然面對著日益強大的中國，我們堅持發聲，道出真相。在疫症期間，中國已經顯示出它實為流氓政權的真面目。而在過去一年，我們一直站在對抗中國極權的最前線。

我們衷心希望，世界並不會因中國承諾的經濟利益而妥協，犧牲一直所秉持的核心價值——亦即對人權的尊重；不應因疫情所帶來的經濟衰退，而靠攏日益橫蠻的中國威權。經濟貿易應建立於平等和公平的基礎之上，而非透過威脅以及霸凌來達致。我們呼籲美國執行《香港人權民主法》，歐盟通過《全球馬格尼茨基人權問責法》，對中國實施制裁，以及在即將與中國達成的貿易協議內加入與香港人權狀況相關的條款。

我們再一次懇請世界與香港同行。

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Beijing has just hammered the final nail in the coffin for Hong Kong’s autonomy. The promise of “one country, two systems” is dead.

Last week, the National People’s Congress (NPC) introduced a draft decision that purports to “establish and improve the legal system and enforcement mechanisms” to “safeguard national security” in Hong Kong. Once passed, the decision will empower the NPC’s Standing Committee to entirely bypass the local legislative process in Hong Kong and implement the infamous “national security law” in the city. On paper, this law aims at prohibiting any act of secession, subversion against the central government, terrorism and foreign interference with Hong Kong affairs. It constitutes, however, a devastating blow to Hong Kong’s already fragile autonomy and civil liberties.

Back in 2003, the Hong Kong government’s forceful attempt to pass a similar piece of legislation in the local legislature was met with uproar from civil society and was aborted. The undemocratic nature of the government proved to be its Achilles’ heel.

More than 15 years later, the legitimacy of the local and central governments faced yet another major challenge amid the 2019 anti-extradition bill movement. But now, Beijing has taken advantage of the global covid-19 pandemic and initiated a series of assaults against Hong Kong’s autonomy while the international community has its hands tied by the virus. It first attempted to institutionalize the “supervisory power” of China’s Liaison Office in the city. The NPC is now further attacking “one country, two systems” by circumventing Hong Kong’s Legislative Council: It legislates by way of inserting the national security law directly to the Annex III of the Basic Law, Hong Kong’s constitution, which will later simply be promulgated by the Hong Kong government.

Three elements helped sustain the 2019 movement: street protests, local electoral institutions and international advocacy efforts. By introducing a series of legal instruments in the name of national security, Beijing wields massive discretionary power to punish protesters and electoral candidates on the one hand, and to cut off Hong Kong from the international society and its crucial support on the other.

Beijing has stepped up its propaganda efforts in Hong Kong by framing the recent protests, peaceful or otherwise, as terrorism. In the future, under the national security law, protesters might easily be subject to much more draconian legal punishments. Worse still, the law explicitly takes aim at foreign interventions “meddling in Hong Kong affairs.” Not only can activists or legislators who have participated in international advocacy efforts be barred from running in elections or even imprisoned, international nongovernmental organizations and other organizations, including their personnel and assets, can also be subject to legal persecution.

Ultimately, without a proper democratic legislative procedure, vague legal terms such as “secession” and “subversion” easily devolve into repressive tools that intrude on our fundamental freedoms and rights, including freedom of speech, assembly and religion. It is not implausible that any criticism against the Chinese or Hong Kong governments — or even demonstration of support for the Hong Kong movements — will soon be construed as a subversive act, punishable by law. This chilling effect will eventually snowball: It starts with widespread self-censorship in the city and then spills over its borders into the rest of the world.
The liberty of the city — from its role of international financial hub to the vibrancy of its civil society — has always been important to the interests of the international community. Furthermore, the promises of “one country, two systems,” “high degree of autonomy” and universal suffrage enshrined in the Basic Law are backed by the Sino-British Joint Declaration, which was recognized under international law. Top-down insertion of the national security law goes beyond a local matter in Hong Kong: It is intended to silence the will of the international community.

Historically, Hong Kong has been the safe haven for the dissident, the liberal-minded and the nonconformist; we speak truth to an increasingly powerful China. Amid the virus, China has revealed its true colors as a rogue state. And in the past year, we have been standing at the forefront against China’s encroaching authoritarianism.

We sincerely hope that the international community will not give in to the economic benefits China has to offer and sacrifice respect for human rights. The economic recession brought by the virus ought not to be resolved through succumbing to China’s encroaching authoritarianism; trade happens on equal and fair terms but not threatening and bullying. We urge the U.S. government to execute the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act, impose sanctions on China and include human rights terms in relation to Hong Kong into trade treaties they are about to conclude with China.
We ask you, once again, to stand with Hong Kong.

【暫別前 只想一齊贏一次(一)】

剛剛才發覺，今天是3.11補選後兩年了。

大概也是適當的時間公布未來的去向－－－如無意外，我會於東京大學公共政策大學院修讀博士課程，立法會選舉前，仍然留在香港幫手。幾多學者屢屢規勸叫人不要讀，我通常的反應是你理得我死，他們每個都心知肚明，在本地大學生存，沒有博士學位入場券，更沒有人把你當作一回事。讀書的設想，十年前當選區議員前有，我是懷著掙扎的心情說自己去向，離任後不時有朋友鼓勵我繼續參選，當做過立法會議員，更莫論身處政治運動風雲變色的世代，我承認絕對可以繼續參選，也是實踐抱負的崗位，甚至可以串嘴點說，要選就主打「港島贏四席」，攤分支持，整個陣營贏，但當選之後呢？學術、政治都是我的志業，未走完學術的木人巷，未有充足的理念做政治，始終心存保留。

議會生涯讓我看到的不是能做到幾多，而是不足有幾多。例如立法，立法會大部分人都不會做，開始埋手才發覺立法學的重要。以前，姚松炎有時在朱凱廸處教授房地產經濟，拆解工務工程，更使我確信知識是開拓政治的武器，經濟學是我長久想學好但缺乏的知識拼圖，我特別感謝他特地有天講了一課拉格朗日乘數，但沒有靜下來、謙卑、有系統的潛修，是不可能學好整套思維，也就不能「用數折服班官」（周庭，2018）。已經行走江湖十年，再不過木人巷，會越來越沒條件過，未來幾年，本地缺乏公共政策訓練，身處外地未能時時與各位同在，不能說好過，正因想貢獻更多，才更需要離開，離開方可更好回來。

撇除我這輩讀畢博士朋友的慘澹遭遇，數年後香港大專院校能否容得下政治履歷鮮明的人如我，未敢說有很大信心；重回政壇則更難料，可能屆時香港島的市民已經忘記了我，不過，政治的貢獻不是有沒有忘記定義，一個做到事的人，幾時都可以回來參選。民主化成功之前，制度建設是民主陣營處理派閥競爭的重要一環，這也是為甚麼我與戴耀廷教授、民主動力等同人，一同推動這一屆立法會選舉的協調機制，我認為這是我暫別香港前最合適的貢獻。

立法會過半的重要性

對協調有保留的人會問，民主陣營本身主張已有根本分歧，勉強協調不過是把支持「收編」：楊岳橋怎可代表本土派的價值觀，鄭松泰也不可能為主流泛民支持者接受。這種派系政治，進入議會隨時一盤散沙，如果全部人不預先表明否決所有議案，製造政治危機，立法會過半是沒有意義。

我的回應是：的確難以要求各派承諾甚麼，現實也很難要求，只能盼望日後當選者有政治智慧，像反對逃犯條例一樣，有覺悟，不計前嫌，盡力做到最好。我們沒有理由議席也未拿到便否定攻陷議會的意義，立法會職能不論多侷限，過半與否，有兩點起碼說服我爭取立法會更多議席是有意義的：

．功能組別壟斷立法會的格局，是回歸以來中共、港共一再僭越多數人意願的手段，施行暴政、掏空庫房。不論是超支工程、還是賣港法案，都以立法會過半數之名獲通過。因為港人包圍立法會，才令政府撤回逃犯條例，我膽敢設想，幾主張以武制暴的朋友，都會認同大半年來幾多人付出，犧牲應該可免則免。軍政府可見將來，只會加強黑警鎮壓的能力，斷難擔保惡法再來，人民足以可以抵住惡法。推動立法會過半，是謀求改變吃人的格局，離過半多一步，多一分可能抵擋暴政的打壓。

．光復社區不是贏了389席區議會議席便完結。我們都嘗過建制派赤化社區，高舉資源、矮化公民參與的社區政治，要令社區免於赤化，除了要區議員用心耕耘社區，立法會議員的支援同樣不可或缺。地區多一席相讓建制派，等於給建制派多一名議員和資源反攻，地區執政的路，仍有賴你我實踐。

沒有人保證幾時中國會變，但手握議會位置，是實實在在的壓力。民主化多年研究也沒有保證反對派取得過半議席會帶來民主化，但「自由化的選舉結果」（Liberalizing electoral outcomes）會令政權不得不承認既有的制度不能再為他們帶來政權穩定，他們要不就撕破臉推倒政治制度，要不便要面對民主改革。(註1) 社會運動固然是主軸，但既有政治格局說明，守株待兔不會重啟政改，毀掉功能組別的格局、突破比例代表制的內耗，是選舉線應做可做的嘗試。

所以，誰當選比較好，不是我主要關心的地方，留待市民決定是較合適的安排。重要的是建立一個恰當的協調制度，起碼可以善用選票，讓議席儘可能落入民主陣營手中，正如區議會，內耗、人事關係、甚至連橫額未掛，我看在眼裡不能說沒有感覺，只盼望大家記得勝利是眾多犧牲所帶來。同樣道理，假如今屆立法會要再下一城，要緊記人的渺少，連商討恰當布陣出戰也做不到，我覺得更大責任。

意見紛雜，一定很難凝聚共識，存小異，求大同，方向一致，總可透過努力化解分歧。至於怎樣做，留待下篇補充。

註1: 威權選舉的民主改革很多人都寫文章說過，那麼多年，我覺得綜合得比較好的是 Gandhi, Jennifer, and Ellen Lust-Okar. "Elections under authoritarianism." Annual review of political science 12 (2009): 403-422.

Photo Credit: 自由亞洲電台

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【 黎安友專文 l 中國如何看待香港危機 】

美國哥倫比亞大學的資深中國通黎安友（Andrew Nathan）教授最近在《外交事務》（Foreign Affairs）雜誌的專文，值得一看。

黎安友是台灣許多中國研究學者的前輩級老師，小英總統去哥大演講時，正是他積極促成。小英在美國的僑宴，黎安友也是座上賓。

這篇文章的標題是：「中國如何看待香港危機：北京自我克制背後的真正原因」。

文章很長，而且用英文寫，需要花點時間閱讀。大家有空可以看看。

Andrew這篇文章的立論基礎，是來自北京核心圈的匿名說法。以他在學術界的地位，我相信他對消息來源已經做了足夠的事實查核或確認。

這篇文章，是在回答一個疑問：中共為何在香港事件如此自制？有人說是怕西方譴責，有人說是怕損害香港的金融地位。

都不是。這篇文章認為，上述兩者都不是中共的真實顧慮。

無論你多痛恨中共，你都必須真實面對你的敵人。

中共是搞經濟階級鬥爭起家的，當年用階級鬥爭打敗國民黨。而現在，中共正用這樣的思維處理香港議題。

文章有一句話：“China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence.” 這句話道盡階級鬥爭的精髓。

中共一點都不焦慮。相反地，中共很有自信，香港的菁英階級及既得利益的收編群體，到最後會支持中共。

這個分化的心理基礎，來自經濟上的利益。

文中還提到，鄧小平當年給香港五十年的一國兩制，就是為了「給香港足夠的時間適應中共的政治系統」。

1997年，香港的GDP佔中國的18%。2018年，這個比例降到2.8%。

今日的香港經濟，在中共的評估，是香港需要中國，而不是中國需要香港。

中共正在在意的，是香港的高房價問題。香港的房價，在過去十年內三倍翻漲。

文章是這樣描述：
“Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.”

無論你同不同意這些說法，都請你試圖客觀地看看這篇文章。

有趣的是，黎安友在文章中部分論點引述了他的消息來源（但他並沒有加上個人評論），部分是他自己的觀察。

#護台胖犬劉仕傑
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新書：《 我在外交部工作 》

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黎安友原文：

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-09-30/how-china-sees-hong-kong-crisis?fbclid=IwAR2PwHns5gWrw0fT0sa5LuO8zgv4PhLmkYfegtBgoOMCD3WJFI3w5NTe0S4

How China Sees the Hong Kong Crisis
The Real Reasons Behind Beijing’s Restraint

By Andrew J. Nathan September 30, 2019

Massive and sometimes violent protests have rocked Hong Kong for over 100 days. Demonstrators have put forward five demands, of which the most radical is a call for free, direct elections of Hong Kong’s chief executive and all members of the territory’s legislature: in other words, a fully democratic system of local rule, one not controlled by Beijing. As this brazen challenge to Chinese sovereignty has played out, Beijing has made a show of amassing paramilitary forces just across the border in Shenzhen. So far, however, China has not deployed force to quell the unrest and top Chinese leaders have refrained from making public threats to do so.

Western observers who remember the violent crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square 30 years ago have been puzzled by Beijing’s forbearance. Some have attributed Beijing’s restraint to a fear of Western condemnation if China uses force. Others have pointed to Beijing’s concern that a crackdown would damage Hong Kong’s role as a financial center for China.

But according to two Chinese scholars who have connections to regime insiders and who requested anonymity to discuss the thinking of policymakers in Beijing, China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence. Beijing is convinced that Hong Kong’s elites and a substantial part of the public do not support the demonstrators and that what truly ails the territory are economic problems rather than political ones—in particular, a combination of stagnant incomes and rising rents. Beijing also believes that, despite the appearance of disorder, its grip on Hong Kong society remains firm. The Chinese Communist Party has long cultivated the territory’s business elites (the so-called tycoons) by offering them favorable economic access to the mainland. The party also maintains a long-standing loyal cadre of underground members in the territory. And China has forged ties with the Hong Kong labor movement and some sections of its criminal underground. Finally, Beijing believes that many ordinary citizens are fearful of change and tired of the disruption caused by the demonstrations.

Beijing therefore thinks that its local allies will stand firm and that the demonstrations will gradually lose public support and eventually die out. As the demonstrations shrink, some frustrated activists will engage in further violence, and that in turn will accelerate the movement’s decline. Meanwhile, Beijing is turning its attention to economic development projects that it believes will address some of the underlying grievances that led many people to take to the streets in the first place.

This view of the situation is held by those at the very top of the regime in Beijing, as evidenced by recent remarks made by Chinese President Xi Jinping, some of which have not been previously reported. In a speech Xi delivered in early September to a new class of rising political stars at the Central Party School in Beijing, he rejected the suggestion of some officials that China should declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong and send in the People’s Liberation Army. “That would be going down a political road of no return,” Xi said. “The central government will exercise the most patience and restraint and allow the [regional government] and the local police force to resolve the crisis.” In separate remarks that Xi made around the same time, he spelled out what he sees as the proper way to proceed: “Economic development is the only golden key to resolving all sorts of problems facing Hong Kong today.”

ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, MANY QUESTIONS

Chinese decision-makers are hardly surprised that Hong Kong is chafing under their rule. Beijing believes it has treated Hong Kong with a light hand and has supported the territory’s economy in many ways, especially by granting it special access to the mainland’s stocks and currency markets, exempting it from the taxes and fees that other Chinese provinces and municipalities pay the central government, and guaranteeing a reliable supply of water, electricity, gas, and food. Even so, Beijing considers disaffection among Hong Kong’s residents a natural outgrowth of the territory’s colonial British past and also a result of the continuing influence of Western values. Indeed, during the 1984 negotiations between China and the United Kingdom over Hong Kong’s future, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping suggested following the approach of “one country, two systems” for 50 years precisely to give people in Hong Kong plenty of time to get used to the Chinese political system.

But “one country, two systems” was never intended to result in Hong Kong spinning out of China’s control. Under the Basic Law that China crafted as Hong Kong’s “mini-constitution,” Beijing retained the right to prevent any challenge to what it considered its core security interests. The law empowered Beijing to determine if and when Hong Kongers could directly elect the territory’s leadership, allowed Beijing to veto laws passed by the Hong Kong Legislative Council, and granted China the right to make final interpretations of the Basic Law. And there would be no question about who had a monopoly of force. During the negotiations with the United Kingdom, Deng publicly rebuked a top Chinese defense official—General Geng Biao, who at the time was a patron of a rising young official named Xi Jinping—for suggesting that there might not be any need to put troops in Hong Kong. Deng insisted that a Chinese garrison was necessary to symbolize Chinese sovereignty.

Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong.

At first, Hong Kongers seemed to accept their new role as citizens of a rising China. In 1997, in a tracking poll of Hong Kong residents regularly conducted by researchers at the University of Hong Kong, 47 percent of respondents identified themselves as “proud” citizens of China. But things went downhill from there. In 2012, the Hong Kong government tried to introduce “patriotic education” in elementary and middle schools, but the proposed curriculum ran into a storm of local opposition and had to be withdrawn. In 2014, the 79-day Umbrella Movement brought hundreds of thousands of citizens into the streets to protest Beijing’s refusal to allow direct elections for the chief executive. And as authoritarianism has intensified under Xi’s rule, events such as the 2015 kidnapping of five Hong Kong–based publishers to stand trial in the mainland further soured Hong Kong opinion. By this past June, only 27 percent of respondents to the tracking poll described themselves as “proud” to be citizens of China. This year’s demonstrations started as a protest against a proposed law that would have allowed Hong Kongers suspected of criminal wrongdoing to be extradited to the mainland but then developed into a broad-based expression of discontent over the lack of democratic accountability, police brutality, and, most fundamentally, what was perceived as a mainland assault on Hong Kong’s unique identity.

Still, Chinese leaders do not blame themselves for these shifts in public opinion. Rather, they believe that Western powers, especially the United States, have sought to drive a wedge between Hong Kong and the mainland. Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong. As Xi explained in his speech in September:
As extreme elements in Hong Kong turn more and more violent, Western forces, especially the United States, have been increasingly open in their involvement. Some extreme anti-China forces in the United States are trying to turn Hong Kong into the battleground for U.S.-Chinese rivalry…. They want to turn Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy into de facto independence, with the ultimate objective to contain China's rise and prevent the revival of the great Chinese nation.

Chinese leaders do not fear that a crackdown on Hong Kong would inspire Western antagonism. Rather, they take such antagonism as a preexisting reality—one that goes a long way toward explaining why the disorder in Hong Kong broke out in the first place. In Beijing’s eyes, Western hostility is rooted in the mere fact of China’s rise, and thus there is no use in tailoring China’s Hong Kong strategy to influence how Western powers would respond.

IT’S NOT ABOUT THE BENJAMINS

The view that Xi has not deployed troops because of Hong Kong’s economic importance to the mainland is also misguided, and relies on an outdated view of the balance of economic power. In 1997, Hong Kong’s GDP was equivalent to 18 percent of the mainland’s. Most of China’s foreign trade was conducted through Hong Kong, providing China with badly needed hard currencies. Chinese companies raised most of their capital on the Hong Kong stock exchange. Today, things are vastly different. In 2018, Hong Kong’s GDP was equal to only 2.7 percent of the mainland’s. Shenzhen alone has overtaken Hong Kong in terms of GDP. Less than 12 percent of China’s exports now flow through Hong Kong. The combined market value of China’s domestic stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen far surpasses that of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and Chinese companies can also list in Frankfurt, London, New York, and elsewhere.

Although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.
Investment flowing into and out of China still tends to pass through financial holding vehicles set up in Hong Kong, in order to benefit from the region’s legal protections. But China’s new foreign investment law (which will take effect on January 1, 2020) and other recent policy changes mean that such investment will soon be able to bypass Hong Kong. And although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.

Wrecking Hong Kong’s economy by using military force to impose emergency rule would not be a good thing for China. But the negative effect on the mainland’s prosperity would not be strong enough to prevent Beijing from doing whatever it believes is necessary to maintain control over the territory.

CAN’T BUY ME LOVE?

As it waits out the current crisis, Beijing has already started tackling the economic problems that it believes are the source of much of the anger among Hong Kongers. Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.