房疫不防疫。
//For Neon Yiu Ching-hei, a member of land concern group Liber Research Community, the outbreak of Covid-19 has highlighted how building conditions affect the poorest households in the city, who are living and quarantining themselves in subdivided units.
“The government thinks that increasing the housing supply will solve the subdivided flat issue, but the supply-oriented direction of the government has led to the deterioration of housing conditions in Hong Kong and that particularly strikes poor households in Hong Kong,”
Yiu says. “I think now is a time to rethink Hong Kong’s housing policy to focus more on improving the housing conditions of the existing stock.”
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housing supply in hong kong 在 護台胖犬 劉仕傑 Facebook 的最佳解答
【 黎安友專文 l 中國如何看待香港危機 】
美國哥倫比亞大學的資深中國通黎安友(Andrew Nathan)教授最近在《外交事務》(Foreign Affairs)雜誌的專文,值得一看。
黎安友是台灣許多中國研究學者的前輩級老師,小英總統去哥大演講時,正是他積極促成。小英在美國的僑宴,黎安友也是座上賓。
這篇文章的標題是:「中國如何看待香港危機:北京自我克制背後的真正原因」。
文章很長,而且用英文寫,需要花點時間閱讀。大家有空可以看看。
Andrew這篇文章的立論基礎,是來自北京核心圈的匿名說法。以他在學術界的地位,我相信他對消息來源已經做了足夠的事實查核或確認。
這篇文章,是在回答一個疑問:中共為何在香港事件如此自制?有人說是怕西方譴責,有人說是怕損害香港的金融地位。
都不是。這篇文章認為,上述兩者都不是中共的真實顧慮。
無論你多痛恨中共,你都必須真實面對你的敵人。
中共是搞經濟階級鬥爭起家的,當年用階級鬥爭打敗國民黨。而現在,中共正用這樣的思維處理香港議題。
文章有一句話:“China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence.” 這句話道盡階級鬥爭的精髓。
中共一點都不焦慮。相反地,中共很有自信,香港的菁英階級及既得利益的收編群體,到最後會支持中共。
這個分化的心理基礎,來自經濟上的利益。
文中還提到,鄧小平當年給香港五十年的一國兩制,就是為了「給香港足夠的時間適應中共的政治系統」。
1997年,香港的GDP佔中國的18%。2018年,這個比例降到2.8%。
今日的香港經濟,在中共的評估,是香港需要中國,而不是中國需要香港。
中共正在在意的,是香港的高房價問題。香港的房價,在過去十年內三倍翻漲。
文章是這樣描述:
“Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.”
無論你同不同意這些說法,都請你試圖客觀地看看這篇文章。
有趣的是,黎安友在文章中部分論點引述了他的消息來源(但他並沒有加上個人評論),部分是他自己的觀察。
#護台胖犬劉仕傑
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新書:《 我在外交部工作 》
**
黎安友原文:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-09-30/how-china-sees-hong-kong-crisis?fbclid=IwAR2PwHns5gWrw0fT0sa5LuO8zgv4PhLmkYfegtBgoOMCD3WJFI3w5NTe0S4
How China Sees the Hong Kong Crisis
The Real Reasons Behind Beijing’s Restraint
By Andrew J. Nathan September 30, 2019
Massive and sometimes violent protests have rocked Hong Kong for over 100 days. Demonstrators have put forward five demands, of which the most radical is a call for free, direct elections of Hong Kong’s chief executive and all members of the territory’s legislature: in other words, a fully democratic system of local rule, one not controlled by Beijing. As this brazen challenge to Chinese sovereignty has played out, Beijing has made a show of amassing paramilitary forces just across the border in Shenzhen. So far, however, China has not deployed force to quell the unrest and top Chinese leaders have refrained from making public threats to do so.
Western observers who remember the violent crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square 30 years ago have been puzzled by Beijing’s forbearance. Some have attributed Beijing’s restraint to a fear of Western condemnation if China uses force. Others have pointed to Beijing’s concern that a crackdown would damage Hong Kong’s role as a financial center for China.
But according to two Chinese scholars who have connections to regime insiders and who requested anonymity to discuss the thinking of policymakers in Beijing, China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence. Beijing is convinced that Hong Kong’s elites and a substantial part of the public do not support the demonstrators and that what truly ails the territory are economic problems rather than political ones—in particular, a combination of stagnant incomes and rising rents. Beijing also believes that, despite the appearance of disorder, its grip on Hong Kong society remains firm. The Chinese Communist Party has long cultivated the territory’s business elites (the so-called tycoons) by offering them favorable economic access to the mainland. The party also maintains a long-standing loyal cadre of underground members in the territory. And China has forged ties with the Hong Kong labor movement and some sections of its criminal underground. Finally, Beijing believes that many ordinary citizens are fearful of change and tired of the disruption caused by the demonstrations.
Beijing therefore thinks that its local allies will stand firm and that the demonstrations will gradually lose public support and eventually die out. As the demonstrations shrink, some frustrated activists will engage in further violence, and that in turn will accelerate the movement’s decline. Meanwhile, Beijing is turning its attention to economic development projects that it believes will address some of the underlying grievances that led many people to take to the streets in the first place.
This view of the situation is held by those at the very top of the regime in Beijing, as evidenced by recent remarks made by Chinese President Xi Jinping, some of which have not been previously reported. In a speech Xi delivered in early September to a new class of rising political stars at the Central Party School in Beijing, he rejected the suggestion of some officials that China should declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong and send in the People’s Liberation Army. “That would be going down a political road of no return,” Xi said. “The central government will exercise the most patience and restraint and allow the [regional government] and the local police force to resolve the crisis.” In separate remarks that Xi made around the same time, he spelled out what he sees as the proper way to proceed: “Economic development is the only golden key to resolving all sorts of problems facing Hong Kong today.”
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, MANY QUESTIONS
Chinese decision-makers are hardly surprised that Hong Kong is chafing under their rule. Beijing believes it has treated Hong Kong with a light hand and has supported the territory’s economy in many ways, especially by granting it special access to the mainland’s stocks and currency markets, exempting it from the taxes and fees that other Chinese provinces and municipalities pay the central government, and guaranteeing a reliable supply of water, electricity, gas, and food. Even so, Beijing considers disaffection among Hong Kong’s residents a natural outgrowth of the territory’s colonial British past and also a result of the continuing influence of Western values. Indeed, during the 1984 negotiations between China and the United Kingdom over Hong Kong’s future, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping suggested following the approach of “one country, two systems” for 50 years precisely to give people in Hong Kong plenty of time to get used to the Chinese political system.
But “one country, two systems” was never intended to result in Hong Kong spinning out of China’s control. Under the Basic Law that China crafted as Hong Kong’s “mini-constitution,” Beijing retained the right to prevent any challenge to what it considered its core security interests. The law empowered Beijing to determine if and when Hong Kongers could directly elect the territory’s leadership, allowed Beijing to veto laws passed by the Hong Kong Legislative Council, and granted China the right to make final interpretations of the Basic Law. And there would be no question about who had a monopoly of force. During the negotiations with the United Kingdom, Deng publicly rebuked a top Chinese defense official—General Geng Biao, who at the time was a patron of a rising young official named Xi Jinping—for suggesting that there might not be any need to put troops in Hong Kong. Deng insisted that a Chinese garrison was necessary to symbolize Chinese sovereignty.
Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong.
At first, Hong Kongers seemed to accept their new role as citizens of a rising China. In 1997, in a tracking poll of Hong Kong residents regularly conducted by researchers at the University of Hong Kong, 47 percent of respondents identified themselves as “proud” citizens of China. But things went downhill from there. In 2012, the Hong Kong government tried to introduce “patriotic education” in elementary and middle schools, but the proposed curriculum ran into a storm of local opposition and had to be withdrawn. In 2014, the 79-day Umbrella Movement brought hundreds of thousands of citizens into the streets to protest Beijing’s refusal to allow direct elections for the chief executive. And as authoritarianism has intensified under Xi’s rule, events such as the 2015 kidnapping of five Hong Kong–based publishers to stand trial in the mainland further soured Hong Kong opinion. By this past June, only 27 percent of respondents to the tracking poll described themselves as “proud” to be citizens of China. This year’s demonstrations started as a protest against a proposed law that would have allowed Hong Kongers suspected of criminal wrongdoing to be extradited to the mainland but then developed into a broad-based expression of discontent over the lack of democratic accountability, police brutality, and, most fundamentally, what was perceived as a mainland assault on Hong Kong’s unique identity.
Still, Chinese leaders do not blame themselves for these shifts in public opinion. Rather, they believe that Western powers, especially the United States, have sought to drive a wedge between Hong Kong and the mainland. Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong. As Xi explained in his speech in September:
As extreme elements in Hong Kong turn more and more violent, Western forces, especially the United States, have been increasingly open in their involvement. Some extreme anti-China forces in the United States are trying to turn Hong Kong into the battleground for U.S.-Chinese rivalry…. They want to turn Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy into de facto independence, with the ultimate objective to contain China's rise and prevent the revival of the great Chinese nation.
Chinese leaders do not fear that a crackdown on Hong Kong would inspire Western antagonism. Rather, they take such antagonism as a preexisting reality—one that goes a long way toward explaining why the disorder in Hong Kong broke out in the first place. In Beijing’s eyes, Western hostility is rooted in the mere fact of China’s rise, and thus there is no use in tailoring China’s Hong Kong strategy to influence how Western powers would respond.
IT’S NOT ABOUT THE BENJAMINS
The view that Xi has not deployed troops because of Hong Kong’s economic importance to the mainland is also misguided, and relies on an outdated view of the balance of economic power. In 1997, Hong Kong’s GDP was equivalent to 18 percent of the mainland’s. Most of China’s foreign trade was conducted through Hong Kong, providing China with badly needed hard currencies. Chinese companies raised most of their capital on the Hong Kong stock exchange. Today, things are vastly different. In 2018, Hong Kong’s GDP was equal to only 2.7 percent of the mainland’s. Shenzhen alone has overtaken Hong Kong in terms of GDP. Less than 12 percent of China’s exports now flow through Hong Kong. The combined market value of China’s domestic stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen far surpasses that of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and Chinese companies can also list in Frankfurt, London, New York, and elsewhere.
Although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.
Investment flowing into and out of China still tends to pass through financial holding vehicles set up in Hong Kong, in order to benefit from the region’s legal protections. But China’s new foreign investment law (which will take effect on January 1, 2020) and other recent policy changes mean that such investment will soon be able to bypass Hong Kong. And although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.
Wrecking Hong Kong’s economy by using military force to impose emergency rule would not be a good thing for China. But the negative effect on the mainland’s prosperity would not be strong enough to prevent Beijing from doing whatever it believes is necessary to maintain control over the territory.
CAN’T BUY ME LOVE?
As it waits out the current crisis, Beijing has already started tackling the economic problems that it believes are the source of much of the anger among Hong Kongers. Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.
housing supply in hong kong 在 姚松炎 Edward Yiu Facebook 的精選貼文
【大嶼填海 為誰而建】
【漠視民意 事倍功半】
<對「明日大嶼」計劃之聲明>
(Please scroll down for English Version)
特首林鄭月娥在剛推出的2018年施政報告中,提出「明日大嶼」計劃,目標在東大嶼填海1700公頃,建造多個人工島。作為建築、測量、都市規劃及園境界別的選委代表,我們對推出的目的、規模、程序及模式均有所保留:
【供過於求,為誰而建】
根據政府統計處推算,香港人口於2043年達至高峰,比現在增長88萬,之後便會回落。但未計現正進行的土地房屋發展和現有閒置的房屋資源,東大嶼填海後便可供110萬人居住,為何要提供過剩的供應?
如此龐大計劃,卻沒有交代規劃願景及土地分布等重要考慮,亦沒有交代填海選址及規模的理據。特首亦明言,此計劃是要「大嶼山會成為通往世界和連接其他大灣區城市的『雙門戶』」,這不禁令人擔心,新造的土地未必能聚焦解決香港的住屋問題。
【漠視民意,無視更佳選項】
土地大辯論剛結束並正進行歸納,眾多專業團體和市民提出了大量寶貴及可行的意見,例如:棕地、軍事用地、私人遊樂場地契約用地、閒置政府地、近岸填海等選項。可惜,在土地專責小組報告未出爐前,特首突然急於推出如此大規模的填海計劃,無視整個土地諮詢,視民意如無物。而且比起大規模填海,這些選項成本較低、技術要求較低、對環境影響也較小,大規模填海是捨易取難,未有充分考慮專業意見。
【不符成本效益】
當提及填海的開支,特首輕描淡寫地說「四五千億走唔甩」。但不少工程專家認為,若計算連接的道路和鐵路,加上近年基建超支的趨勢,保守估計亦要一萬億,大約是香港外匯儲備的一半。若工程期間遇到不可預期的情況,如早前港珠澳大橋人工島移位之類,開支更會進一步飆升。當然,一萬億是否合乎成本效益,要看有否其他可達至同樣目的,但成本較低的選項。而在土地供應問題上,明顯有不少成本低得多的選擇,如收回粉嶺高爾夫球場、收回棕地等。
【合理分配,按步推展】
土地和房屋問題可分短、中、長三階段處理,因而直接影響儲備的分配。在填海的開支上,若單項投放一萬億而忽略了短中期房屋措施的資金投入,恐怕顧此失彼,未能達到成果效益的社會平衡,恐陷頭重腳輕寸步難行的困境。
【天人共存,敬畏自然】
超強颱風山竹吹襲香港,市面一片狼藉,情景還歷歷在目。當大眾開始感受到全球暖化所帶來的天然災害,大規模填海是反其道而行,因其耗能大、碳排放極高,對環境影響也是不可逆轉的。雖然特首說「氣象風險可管理」,但大自然的力量並不是人類可以匹敵的。加上如此大規模的填海,需要運用大量海砂,對填海的海域和海砂的出產地造成嚴重生態災難。其實造地應以順應大自然的方式,並考慮以人居、環境互相配合的新式設計,而非因循上世紀「新市鎮」的發展模式。就算填海是不可避免,亦可以推進式堤岸及分散式堆填等方法,在增加土地的同時產生宜居及保育沿岸生態系統,相對大規模的填海工程更能抵禦氣候變化的環境改變。
【總結】
我們作為建築師、測量師、規劃師、園境師,一向關心香港的土地和房屋問題,亦明白到這些問題的急切性。但「明日大嶼」計劃不但不能解決問題,更會引發很多不能逆轉的影響。
在過去五個月,無論官方的專家小組,或者民間研究組織,在土地諮詢過程中提出了很多優秀的方案。所以,我們呼籲林鄭月娥特首,為香港福祉,為了我們的下一代,暫停「明日大嶼」計劃,重新找出一個有利香港未來的土地發展方案,讓市民共同參與,為未來重燃希望。
<建築、測量、都市規劃及園境界別選委>:
陳彥璘 蔣偉騏 黎可頴 林穎茵 陳潔華
林芷筠 柳凱瑩 關兆倫 鄭炳鴻 敖鋅琦
黎永鋒 黃智鈞 司馬文 陳元敬 高嘉雲
劉紹禧 汪整樂 陳堯坤 雷雯
【Lantau Tomorrow - Who is it for ?】
In the 2018 Policy Address, Chief Executive Mrs. Carrie Lam announced the “Lantau Tomorrow Vision” which targets to construct artificial islands with a total area of about 1700 hectares through massive land reclamation. As Election Committee members of the Architectural, Surveying, Planning and Landscape Subsector, we have reservations on the objective, scale and procedures of the proposal:
【Oversupply of land, who is it for ?】
According to the projection of the Census and Statistics Department, population of Hong Kong will reach its peak at 2043 which means there will be an increase of 880,000 people compared to the current population. Population will then decrease gradually. If we disregard the current land and housing development and vacant residential units, the proposed artificial islands alone can accommodate 1,100,000 people. Why do we have to create more supply than demand?
Important information like planning visions and land use plan was not announced, justification of reclamation scale and site selection was also absent. This is unusual and far from satisfaction for such a massive development proposal. The CE claimed that the proposal is for “making Lantau a “Double Gateway” to the world and other Greater Bay Area cities.” This makes people speculate whether the land created will be for solving housing problem in Hong Kong?
【Public Opinion Ignored】
The public consultation on land supply has just completed and the Task Force on Land Supply has not concluded the public opinions. During the consultation process, a lot of ideas were discussed and submitted. The feasible land supply options include: brownfield sites, military sites, sites under private recreational leases, vacant government land and near-shore reclamation. Surprisingly, the CE announced the massive reclamation proposal before the report of the Land Supply Taskforce, without paying respect to the consultation and all public opinions collected. Moreover, comparing to massive reclamation, the options raised in the consultation process cost less, face less technical difficulties and have less impact to the environment. Professional knowledge is apparently not thoroughly considered in the proposal.
【Not Cost Efficient】
The CE mentioned the cost of reclamation will be “roughly 4-5 hundred billions”. However, engineering experts estimated that, including all the connecting roads and railways with consideration of recent trend of infrastructure over budget, the cost of constructing the artificial islands will be at least a thousand billions ---- this will be equivalent to half of Hong Kong’s foreign currency reserve. If unforeseen conditions were encountered during construction, such as drifting of artificial island in the Hong Kong–Zhuhai–Macau Bridge construction, the cost will be further soared. When we assess whether a project is cost efficient, we will try to see whether there is any lower cost alternatives that can achieve the same objective. The one-thousand-billion artificial islands are obviously not cost efficient as there are other options that cost a lot less such as developing the Fanling golf course and developing brownfield sites in the N.T.
【Balanced Resources Allocation】
Land and housing problems need to be solved in 3 stages: short-term, medium-term and long-term. Resources have to be allocated appropriately to all stages in order to have a coherent result. If a thousand billions were invested in a single long-term project, the resources for short-term and medium-term solutions will inevitably be limited. Such resource imbalance cannot create the desired social return.
【Living with Natural Harmony】
Our memory is fresh with the destruction of Typhoon Mangkhut which we experience the consequence of global warming. Massive reclamation is a bad response to climate change. It will spend massive energy, vast amount of carbon emission and it will bring irreversible impact to the ecosystem. Although our CE claimed that “climate risks can be mitigated”, natural force is nothing human being can be compared. In addition, this scale of massive reclamation will need incredible amount of marine sand. It will bring forth ecological disaster to the reclamation area as well as the marine sand mining area. For sustainable development, land supply shall adopt methods that are harmonious with the environment and design that balance between human habitat and nature. Just following the “New Town Development” mode that was used a century ago is not going to be a good solution. Even reclamation is inevitable, progressive reclamation along the coast shall be considered first which is more friendly to the marine ecology and less impactful to climate change.
【Conclusion】
As Architects, Surveyors, Planners and Landscape Architects, we are deeply concerned with the land and housing problems in Hong Kong. We also understand this is an urgent issue that we have to face and tackle immediately. However, we doubt whether the “Lantau Tomorrow Vision” can solve the problem, indeed, we worry that it will even bring us irreversible impacts.
In the past 5 months during the public land consultation, the official land task force and many civil research groups have proposed many feasible solutions for land supply. We urge the CE, for the sake of sustainable development in Hong Kong and for our generations to come, suspend the “Lantau Tomorrow Vision” proposal. Let’s work together with the people for a better Hong Kong and bring hopes to our future.
Chan Yin Lun Jeremy, Tseung Wai Ki, Lai Ho Wing, Lam Wing Yan, Chan Kit Wah Eva, Lam Tsz Kwan, Lau Hoi Ying, Kwan Siu Lun, Chang Ping Hung, Ngo Tsz Kei, Lai Wing Fung, Wong Chi Kwan, Paul Zimmerman, Chan Yuen King Paul, Gavin Coates, Lau Siu Hay Derek, Wong Ching Lok Christopher, Chan Yiu Kwan, Lui Man
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