Vimeo; are you kidding?
"Bandwidth" is a pass through cost for Vimeo in which we pay our CDN partners a per GB rate to deliver our client's video content.
On some high-consumption accounts (including your account), Vimeo has been losing money supporting their usage. This has become problematic for our leadership team and they made the decision to implement a fair use policy in which we reserve the right to charge the top 1% of bandwidth consuming accounts based on the amount of bandwidth they are utilizing.
同時也有4部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過16萬的網紅C CHANNEL Art&Study DIY Crafts Handmade,也在其Youtube影片中提到,■ Working time: About 10 minutes ■ Material cost: About $2 【Materials】 · Flat elastic piece · Masking tape made of cloth (2 kinds) · Drawing pap...
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pass-through cost 在 護台胖犬 劉仕傑 Facebook 的精選貼文
【 黎安友專文 l 中國如何看待香港危機 】
美國哥倫比亞大學的資深中國通黎安友(Andrew Nathan)教授最近在《外交事務》(Foreign Affairs)雜誌的專文,值得一看。
黎安友是台灣許多中國研究學者的前輩級老師,小英總統去哥大演講時,正是他積極促成。小英在美國的僑宴,黎安友也是座上賓。
這篇文章的標題是:「中國如何看待香港危機:北京自我克制背後的真正原因」。
文章很長,而且用英文寫,需要花點時間閱讀。大家有空可以看看。
Andrew這篇文章的立論基礎,是來自北京核心圈的匿名說法。以他在學術界的地位,我相信他對消息來源已經做了足夠的事實查核或確認。
這篇文章,是在回答一個疑問:中共為何在香港事件如此自制?有人說是怕西方譴責,有人說是怕損害香港的金融地位。
都不是。這篇文章認為,上述兩者都不是中共的真實顧慮。
無論你多痛恨中共,你都必須真實面對你的敵人。
中共是搞經濟階級鬥爭起家的,當年用階級鬥爭打敗國民黨。而現在,中共正用這樣的思維處理香港議題。
文章有一句話:“China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence.” 這句話道盡階級鬥爭的精髓。
中共一點都不焦慮。相反地,中共很有自信,香港的菁英階級及既得利益的收編群體,到最後會支持中共。
這個分化的心理基礎,來自經濟上的利益。
文中還提到,鄧小平當年給香港五十年的一國兩制,就是為了「給香港足夠的時間適應中共的政治系統」。
1997年,香港的GDP佔中國的18%。2018年,這個比例降到2.8%。
今日的香港經濟,在中共的評估,是香港需要中國,而不是中國需要香港。
中共正在在意的,是香港的高房價問題。香港的房價,在過去十年內三倍翻漲。
文章是這樣描述:
“Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.”
無論你同不同意這些說法,都請你試圖客觀地看看這篇文章。
有趣的是,黎安友在文章中部分論點引述了他的消息來源(但他並沒有加上個人評論),部分是他自己的觀察。
#護台胖犬劉仕傑
Instagram: old_dog_chasing_ball
新書:《 我在外交部工作 》
**
黎安友原文:
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2019-09-30/how-china-sees-hong-kong-crisis?fbclid=IwAR2PwHns5gWrw0fT0sa5LuO8zgv4PhLmkYfegtBgoOMCD3WJFI3w5NTe0S4
How China Sees the Hong Kong Crisis
The Real Reasons Behind Beijing’s Restraint
By Andrew J. Nathan September 30, 2019
Massive and sometimes violent protests have rocked Hong Kong for over 100 days. Demonstrators have put forward five demands, of which the most radical is a call for free, direct elections of Hong Kong’s chief executive and all members of the territory’s legislature: in other words, a fully democratic system of local rule, one not controlled by Beijing. As this brazen challenge to Chinese sovereignty has played out, Beijing has made a show of amassing paramilitary forces just across the border in Shenzhen. So far, however, China has not deployed force to quell the unrest and top Chinese leaders have refrained from making public threats to do so.
Western observers who remember the violent crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in Tiananmen Square 30 years ago have been puzzled by Beijing’s forbearance. Some have attributed Beijing’s restraint to a fear of Western condemnation if China uses force. Others have pointed to Beijing’s concern that a crackdown would damage Hong Kong’s role as a financial center for China.
But according to two Chinese scholars who have connections to regime insiders and who requested anonymity to discuss the thinking of policymakers in Beijing, China’s response has been rooted not in anxiety but in confidence. Beijing is convinced that Hong Kong’s elites and a substantial part of the public do not support the demonstrators and that what truly ails the territory are economic problems rather than political ones—in particular, a combination of stagnant incomes and rising rents. Beijing also believes that, despite the appearance of disorder, its grip on Hong Kong society remains firm. The Chinese Communist Party has long cultivated the territory’s business elites (the so-called tycoons) by offering them favorable economic access to the mainland. The party also maintains a long-standing loyal cadre of underground members in the territory. And China has forged ties with the Hong Kong labor movement and some sections of its criminal underground. Finally, Beijing believes that many ordinary citizens are fearful of change and tired of the disruption caused by the demonstrations.
Beijing therefore thinks that its local allies will stand firm and that the demonstrations will gradually lose public support and eventually die out. As the demonstrations shrink, some frustrated activists will engage in further violence, and that in turn will accelerate the movement’s decline. Meanwhile, Beijing is turning its attention to economic development projects that it believes will address some of the underlying grievances that led many people to take to the streets in the first place.
This view of the situation is held by those at the very top of the regime in Beijing, as evidenced by recent remarks made by Chinese President Xi Jinping, some of which have not been previously reported. In a speech Xi delivered in early September to a new class of rising political stars at the Central Party School in Beijing, he rejected the suggestion of some officials that China should declare a state of emergency in Hong Kong and send in the People’s Liberation Army. “That would be going down a political road of no return,” Xi said. “The central government will exercise the most patience and restraint and allow the [regional government] and the local police force to resolve the crisis.” In separate remarks that Xi made around the same time, he spelled out what he sees as the proper way to proceed: “Economic development is the only golden key to resolving all sorts of problems facing Hong Kong today.”
ONE COUNTRY, TWO SYSTEMS, MANY QUESTIONS
Chinese decision-makers are hardly surprised that Hong Kong is chafing under their rule. Beijing believes it has treated Hong Kong with a light hand and has supported the territory’s economy in many ways, especially by granting it special access to the mainland’s stocks and currency markets, exempting it from the taxes and fees that other Chinese provinces and municipalities pay the central government, and guaranteeing a reliable supply of water, electricity, gas, and food. Even so, Beijing considers disaffection among Hong Kong’s residents a natural outgrowth of the territory’s colonial British past and also a result of the continuing influence of Western values. Indeed, during the 1984 negotiations between China and the United Kingdom over Hong Kong’s future, the Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping suggested following the approach of “one country, two systems” for 50 years precisely to give people in Hong Kong plenty of time to get used to the Chinese political system.
But “one country, two systems” was never intended to result in Hong Kong spinning out of China’s control. Under the Basic Law that China crafted as Hong Kong’s “mini-constitution,” Beijing retained the right to prevent any challenge to what it considered its core security interests. The law empowered Beijing to determine if and when Hong Kongers could directly elect the territory’s leadership, allowed Beijing to veto laws passed by the Hong Kong Legislative Council, and granted China the right to make final interpretations of the Basic Law. And there would be no question about who had a monopoly of force. During the negotiations with the United Kingdom, Deng publicly rebuked a top Chinese defense official—General Geng Biao, who at the time was a patron of a rising young official named Xi Jinping—for suggesting that there might not be any need to put troops in Hong Kong. Deng insisted that a Chinese garrison was necessary to symbolize Chinese sovereignty.
Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong.
At first, Hong Kongers seemed to accept their new role as citizens of a rising China. In 1997, in a tracking poll of Hong Kong residents regularly conducted by researchers at the University of Hong Kong, 47 percent of respondents identified themselves as “proud” citizens of China. But things went downhill from there. In 2012, the Hong Kong government tried to introduce “patriotic education” in elementary and middle schools, but the proposed curriculum ran into a storm of local opposition and had to be withdrawn. In 2014, the 79-day Umbrella Movement brought hundreds of thousands of citizens into the streets to protest Beijing’s refusal to allow direct elections for the chief executive. And as authoritarianism has intensified under Xi’s rule, events such as the 2015 kidnapping of five Hong Kong–based publishers to stand trial in the mainland further soured Hong Kong opinion. By this past June, only 27 percent of respondents to the tracking poll described themselves as “proud” to be citizens of China. This year’s demonstrations started as a protest against a proposed law that would have allowed Hong Kongers suspected of criminal wrongdoing to be extradited to the mainland but then developed into a broad-based expression of discontent over the lack of democratic accountability, police brutality, and, most fundamentally, what was perceived as a mainland assault on Hong Kong’s unique identity.
Still, Chinese leaders do not blame themselves for these shifts in public opinion. Rather, they believe that Western powers, especially the United States, have sought to drive a wedge between Hong Kong and the mainland. Statements made by U.S. politicians in support of the recent demonstrations only confirm Beijing’s belief that Washington seeks to inflame radical sentiments in Hong Kong. As Xi explained in his speech in September:
As extreme elements in Hong Kong turn more and more violent, Western forces, especially the United States, have been increasingly open in their involvement. Some extreme anti-China forces in the United States are trying to turn Hong Kong into the battleground for U.S.-Chinese rivalry…. They want to turn Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy into de facto independence, with the ultimate objective to contain China's rise and prevent the revival of the great Chinese nation.
Chinese leaders do not fear that a crackdown on Hong Kong would inspire Western antagonism. Rather, they take such antagonism as a preexisting reality—one that goes a long way toward explaining why the disorder in Hong Kong broke out in the first place. In Beijing’s eyes, Western hostility is rooted in the mere fact of China’s rise, and thus there is no use in tailoring China’s Hong Kong strategy to influence how Western powers would respond.
IT’S NOT ABOUT THE BENJAMINS
The view that Xi has not deployed troops because of Hong Kong’s economic importance to the mainland is also misguided, and relies on an outdated view of the balance of economic power. In 1997, Hong Kong’s GDP was equivalent to 18 percent of the mainland’s. Most of China’s foreign trade was conducted through Hong Kong, providing China with badly needed hard currencies. Chinese companies raised most of their capital on the Hong Kong stock exchange. Today, things are vastly different. In 2018, Hong Kong’s GDP was equal to only 2.7 percent of the mainland’s. Shenzhen alone has overtaken Hong Kong in terms of GDP. Less than 12 percent of China’s exports now flow through Hong Kong. The combined market value of China’s domestic stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen far surpasses that of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, and Chinese companies can also list in Frankfurt, London, New York, and elsewhere.
Although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.
Investment flowing into and out of China still tends to pass through financial holding vehicles set up in Hong Kong, in order to benefit from the region’s legal protections. But China’s new foreign investment law (which will take effect on January 1, 2020) and other recent policy changes mean that such investment will soon be able to bypass Hong Kong. And although Hong Kong remains the largest offshore clearing center for renminbi, that role could easily be filled by London or Singapore, if Chinese leaders so desired.
Wrecking Hong Kong’s economy by using military force to impose emergency rule would not be a good thing for China. But the negative effect on the mainland’s prosperity would not be strong enough to prevent Beijing from doing whatever it believes is necessary to maintain control over the territory.
CAN’T BUY ME LOVE?
As it waits out the current crisis, Beijing has already started tackling the economic problems that it believes are the source of much of the anger among Hong Kongers. Housing prices have tripled over the past decade; today, the median price of a house is more than 20 times the median gross annual household income. The median rent has increased by nearly 25 percent in the past six years. As many as 250,000 people are waiting for public housing. At the same time, income growth for many Hong Kong residents has fallen below the overall increase in cost of living.
pass-through cost 在 雷尼 Rainey Facebook 的精選貼文
M109R是一款讓人念念不忘,咀嚼回味的好車,在109俱樂部裡還不少人是換兩台騎。大部分的人會被那碩大的外型震攝住,覺得它不好駕馭,不好鑽等等。但內心卻又喜歡它的霸氣與大器,於是那股一見鍾情的激情戰勝理智時,恭喜成為新車主,隨之而來的才是學習如何與109相處,這簡直和古代媒說之言沒兩樣,先結婚後談戀愛,好消息是越陷越深者十之八九,退婚者通常是今朝苦短。
109的加速表現在嬉皮車裡名列前茅,高速穩定性更是令人激賞,長軸距雖然帶來彎道不利,但適應後卻別有一番成就感。這絕非自賣自誇,此車在台灣累積銷售也有數百輛之譜,新車價超高CP值(若同等級YAMAHA/HONDA至少八十萬起跳),中古保值抗衰,更得許多美式玩家青睞。
約莫與109半年時間的相處,你便能如同駕馭速克達一般在車陣中穿梭,一年以上你就可以毫不思索地殺入任何彎道,享受退檔煞車,側傾全油門進檔的彎道裡的一氣呵成。如此龐然大物在彎道中的是不疾不徐,猶如飛鷹盤旋的優雅與氣定神閒。然而這還不是此車的唯一,它0-100KM/H三秒的超加速感覺,美式機車裡寥寥無幾。
M109 is a memorable bike that has a lingering aftertaste in many riders deepest mind. Many of the members in Taiwan 109 riders club have two bikes to switch from due to different occasion. Many folks have been intimidated by the massive size of the bike, linking it to bulky and hard to pass through traffic demerit, but still fancy about the bold and mean cruiser style. Therefore, it is the battle between passion and reason before actually buying it. Once, you acquired the new bike, it is the constant mutual learning process between you and the bike. It is pretty similar the traditional Chinese arranged marriage, which is decided by your parents that you married first and get acquaintance with your bike later. The good news is that most people stuck deeply into 109’s world afterward instead of getting a divorce.
109 acceleration performances is one of the top choice in the cruiser bike world, what’s more impressing is its high speed stability. Longer wheelbase may diminish its agility in cornering, however after some riding experience; everyone could find the perfect balance to handle it. 109 has been sold more than hundreds in Taiwan, with good cost-performance ratio (Yahmaha or Honda cost much higher for the same range of bike), and a solid resale price contributing to a wide range of cruiser-lover’s attention.
Spend about half a year with your 109; you could harness this beast like riding a scooter dodging across traffic. For more than a year with it, you can speed in and out corners without a doubt, enjoying down-shifting braking and full throttle up-shifting in high speed cornering. This huge bike should handle the corners as cool as a cucumber and dashing from 0 to 60 mph in approx three seconds, thus there is almost no rival for 109 in this category.
pass-through cost 在 C CHANNEL Art&Study DIY Crafts Handmade Youtube 的最佳貼文
■ Working time: About 10 minutes
■ Material cost: About $2
【Materials】
· Flat elastic piece
· Masking tape made of cloth (2 kinds)
· Drawing paper
· Scissors
· Utility knife
【Steps】
① Cut the masking tape to length that goes around whole book
② Cut flat elastic to length that goes around cover of book
③ Paste flat elastic on the adhesive surface of the masking tape while stretching it
④ Attach another masking tape to ③ so that the flat elastic will not be visible
⑤ Cut the drawing paper to size 4 × 2.5 cm and then cut corners in the shape of an arrow
⑥ Cut two notches according to the width of the masking tape
⑦ Pass ④ through the incision
⑧ Prepare a masking tape cut to about 2.5 times the width of the masking tape
⑨ Align the edges of ④ so that it becomes a circle and connect with the masking tape of ⑧
Done!
■作業時間:約10分
■材料費:約200円
【用意するもの】
・平ゴム
・布製マスキングテープ お好みで2種
・画用紙
・ハサミ
・カッター
【作り方】
①マスキングテープを本全体の縦一周分の長さに切っておく
②平ゴムは本の表紙の縦一周分の長さに切っておく
③マスキングテープの粘着面に平ゴムを伸ばしながら貼っていく
④もう一つのマスキングテープを平ゴムが見えなくなるように、③に貼り付けていく
⑤4×2.5cmに切った画用紙の角二つを矢印の形になるように切る
⑥マスキングテープの幅に合わせ、切り込みを2箇所入れる
⑦切り込みに④を通す
⑧マスキングテープの幅に対し約2.5倍分の長さに切ったマスキングテープを用意する
⑨④が輪になるように端と端を合わせ、⑤のマスキングテープで止めれば
完成♪
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pass-through cost 在 C CHANNEL Art&Study DIY Crafts Handmade Youtube 的最佳解答
Working time: About 20 minutes
Material cost: Approx. $2
【Materials】
· Fastener (at your preferred length)
· Pearl beads
· Synthetic fiber thread
· Needle
· String end stopper
・ Round jump ring
· Lobster clasp
【Steps】
① Pass the string through the needle and tie a ball at the end
② Pass through the teeth of the fastener and put one pearl bead on
③ Pass through the opposite teeth and then another pearl bead
④ Thread so that there is a space as you like and pass through the opposite teeth and put pearl beads on
⑤ Repeat ③ ④
⑥ After inserting the last pearl bead, tie down on the back side of the fastener
⑦ Cut the extra cloth
⑧ Put a string tie on the free end and attach a lobster claw on
Finished!
作業時間:約20分
材料費:約200円
【用意するもの】
・ファスナー(お好みの長さで)
・パールビーズ
・テグス
・針
・紐留め
・丸カン
・かにかん
【作り方】
① 針にテグスを通し、玉結びをしておく
② ファスナーの口にテグスを通し、パールビーズを一つ入れる
③ ファスナーの最初に通した口の対面の口、パールビーズの順でテグスを通す
④ お好みの間隔分あけるように、ファスナーの口を通し、パールビーズを入れる
⑤ ③④を繰り返す
⑥ 最後のパールビーズを入れたら、ファスナーの裏側で玉留めする
⑦ ファスナーの余分な布をカットする
⑧ 空いている端に紐留めを挟み、丸カンでかにかんを取り付ければ
完成!
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pass-through cost 在 C CHANNEL Art&Study DIY Crafts Handmade Youtube 的最佳解答
■ Working time: Approximately 50 minutes
■ Material cost: About $7
【Materials】
· Masking tape
· Cherry blossom frame
· UV resin hoshi-no-shizuku HARD
· Coloring agent for resin houseki-no-shizuku Pink
· Glitter Powder Pink
· Palette
· Mixing stick (it can be a toothpick)
· UV light
· Acrylic stone / clear
· Petal Parts
※ We are using resin parts made with a petal mold
· Stick file
Round jump ring
·chain
· Pearl Parts
· Earring parts
【Steps】
1) Roll the masking tape and paste it on the desk
2) Paste and fix cherry blossom frame
3) Color the resin and add glitter and pour it into the frame
4) Place a small amount of clear resin on top of it and make a gradation
5) Cure
6) Apply a small amount of resin, place a stone and cure
7) Peel off from the masking tape and also harden the back side
8) Drill a hole with a file in the petal part
9) Pass through round jump ring and chain
10) Connect cherry frame parts, petal parts, pearl parts with round jump rings
11) Add earring parts and done!
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