今天非常高興能夠與 #嘉義竹崎高中 #蘇淵源 校長,就未來國際交流合作的方向交換意見。
這一次報告的,是我們優秀的實習生 Grace Faerber、馮思思,她是🇺🇸博倫獎學人(該計畫,是美國國家安全教育計劃National Security Education Program,給予研究生的獎助計畫),以及我們的研究實習生、🇮🇳尼赫魯大學畢業的Naina Singh (辛妮娜) ,希望能夠志願使用雙語、將多元的國際文化教流分享給嘉義的同學。
台灣世代智庫與🇺🇸約翰霍普金斯大學、還有🇹🇼我國、🇮🇳印度的各級院校,都有多元的合作關係、一起努力!
Today it was a pleasure to meet with Principal Yuan-Yuan Su of Chiayi County Junior Senior High School on the future of international education exchange and cooperation with Taiwan NextGen. Our Foundation has worked to diversify our cooperative relationships with educational institutions all over the globe, most recently with Johns Hopkins University in Washington, DC, as well as in India and at various regional levels in Taiwan. Beyond conducting research, Taiwan NextGen Foundation seeks to bring bilingual and multilingual education to local communities in Taiwan outside of Taipei. We look forward to working with Principle Su and Chiayi Schools Director Chen Wanting to engage the students in Chiayi County and widen their exposure to the international community.
同時也有4部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過106萬的網紅Adam Bradshaw,也在其Youtube影片中提到,สอบถามเรื่องคอร์สได้ที่ไลน์ https://lin.ee/uVp0whL (@ajarnadam) หรือโทร 02 612 9300 รายละเอียดคอร์ส https://www.ajarnadam.tv/ FB: http://www.facebook....
「principle principal」的推薦目錄:
- 關於principle principal 在 陳冠廷 Kuan-Ting Chen Facebook 的最讚貼文
- 關於principle principal 在 อาจารย์อดัม Facebook 的最讚貼文
- 關於principle principal 在 堅離地城:沈旭暉國際生活台 Simon's Glos World Facebook 的最讚貼文
- 關於principle principal 在 Adam Bradshaw Youtube 的最佳解答
- 關於principle principal 在 Louise Page Youtube 的最佳貼文
- 關於principle principal 在 Daphne LE Youtube 的精選貼文
- 關於principle principal 在 Principal or principle? - YouTube 的評價
- 關於principle principal 在 How to Pronounce Principle and Principal - Facebook 的評價
- 關於principle principal 在 "Principle" or "Principal"? - English Stack Exchange 的評價
principle principal 在 อาจารย์อดัม Facebook 的最讚貼文
Principle กับ Principal ใช้ต่างกันอย่างไร ?
Which sentence is written correctly?
A. The student was called to the principle's office.
B. That's a very important religious principal.
C. The principal reason for this change is lack of time.
D. He's been the principle of this high school for several years.
principle principal 在 堅離地城:沈旭暉國際生活台 Simon's Glos World Facebook 的最讚貼文
【#TheDiplomat: 沈旭暉隨緣家書英文版🇭🇰】很久沒有向國際關係評論網 The Diplomat 供稿,但國際線十分重要,不應放棄。這次他們希望分享23條、國安法、反恐法風雨欲來的「新香港」前瞻,願國際社會能多了解快將出現的危機:
While the world is preoccupied with a fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing has been tightening its political grip on all aspects of Hong Kong’s civil society. Rumor has it that Beijing will push through legislating national security laws under Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law by unconventional means, such as massively disqualifying pro-democratic legislators or even directly applying a national law, widely argued as a major step to destroy the rights and freedom of Hong Kongers, and bring Chinese authoritarianism to Hong Kong.
After the 2019 protests, the administration of Carrie Lam, who theoretically is still leading the special administrative region of China, has little political capital at stake, with its legitimacy reaching rock bottom. The pro-government camp has dwindling prospects for the city’s upcoming Legislative Council election. The government‘s ”nothing to lose“ mentality is apparent from its recent blatant reinterpretation of the Basic Law’s Article 22 (another article that limits the influence of China’s offices in Hong Kong’s internal affairs). The debate is nothing new, but the pressure this time is quite different.
This article highlights the different strategies Beijing could adopt to enact Article 23 insidiously or under disguise to avoid backlash from the international community, while continuing to reap benefits from the city’s globally recognized special status. This seems to be part of Beijing’s brinkmanship to bring Hong Kong protesters and their supporters to their knees and move the city closer to authoritarianism. To counter these moves, Hong Kongers must define the boundaries beyond which Hong Kong falls into authoritarian rule and make a case as to why the city’s downfall is detrimental to the international community‘s interest.
The Long-Term Controversy Over National Security Laws
Back in 2003, the implementation of Article 23 was thwarted by the moderate pro-establishment politician James Tien. In face of overwhelming public disapproval of the law, he withdrew support and votes from his Liberal Party. However, 17 years later, it is hard to imagine Beijing following the old legislative playbook: start with a public consultation, followed by public discourse and political debate, and end with the majority rule. This playbook only works in peaceful societies ruled by a trustworthy government with integrity.
The aftermath of 2003, as well as the 2019 protests, should have taught Beijing and the Hong Kong government a lesson: pushing through national security legislation in a flawed parliament controlled by the minority pro-government camp would inevitably set off another full city-scale protest — and undoubtedly more fierce and focused this time. Given the current government’s numerous displays of dishonesty, it is conceivable that they will embark on a less-traveled path to implement Article 23.
Strategy One: “Anti-Terrorism”
In principle, one possible strategy could be to directly enact Chinese national law across Hong Kong, which can be achieved by declaring a state of emergency in the city. However, this is risky business as it would tarnish the integrity of “one country two systems” and subsequently Hong Kong’s international standing. Beijing, a risk-averse regime, is also unwilling to see Hong Kong’s status as a middleman for laundering money disappear into thin air.
Instead, Beijing could be concocting a narrative that would see Chinese national law applied to Hong Kong while not damaging Hong Kong’s international standing and Beijing’s own interests. The key word in this script is “anti-terrorism.” As early as 2014, pro-Beijing scholars have been claiming the emergence of “local terrorist ideology” on Hong Kong soil. Since the anti-extradition bill protests last year, government rhetoric frequently described the protests, which caused no deaths at all in the entire year, with phrases like “inclination to terrorist ideology.” That was a signal to the world that Hong Kong’s internal conflicts had ballooned into a national security issue. This gives the government the legitimacy to justify the implementation of Chinese national laws across the highly autonomous region to counter terrorism. The Chinese government knows that if it can persuade the world that terrorism exists in Hong Kong, and that it is as severe as the terror threat facing many other nations today, the international community will be less critical of Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong. Enacting Chinese laws directly is a convenient path that will save Beijing from having to tackle Hong Kong’s internal conflicts, basically turning the Hong Kong issue into a nonissue.
Strategy Two: Stacking the Legislature by Disqualifying Candidates
An even bolder strategy was probably foretold by a recent incident where the Hong Kong government and Beijing’s agencies for Hong Kong affairs (HKMAO and the Liaison Office) jointly criticized lawmaker Dennis Kwok for filibustering, framing it as “misconduct in public office” and “violating his oath.” It is incomprehensible to claim that filibustering goes against a lawmaker’s main duty; rather, it is common understanding that legislative work includes debating the law and representing public opinion against unreasonable laws. In a parliament controlled by the minority, pro-democratic members representing the majority of Hong Kongers are forced to express their objections using means like filibustering. Wouldn’t a lack of different political opinions turn the legislative branch into a rubber-stamp institution?
The above allegation has set a dangerous precedent for twisting the logic behind a certain provision in the Basic Law to target opposing lawmakers. In other words, to fulfill Beijing’s interpretation of the principal requirement for holding public office in Hong Kong, one could be required to take a meticulously legalistic approach to uphold the Basic Law down to its every single wording. A public official, by this new definition, not only needs to support “one country, two systems” or object Hong Kong independence, but also must abide by every single provision in the Basic Law. Worst of all, based on the previous cases, whether an official’s words or actions oversteps a provision is up to Beijing’s interpretation of his/her “intent.”
If this approach is applied, in the next election, there might be additional official questions for screening candidates like the following: “The Basic Law states that the enactment of Article 23 is a constitutional duty. Failing to support Article 23 legislation violates the Basic Law. Do you support it?” This question would suffice to disqualify even moderate or even pro-establishment candidates like James Tien. Even if any pro-democratic candidates were elected, once Article 23 re-enters the legislative process, they could risk ouster by raising objections.
Despite the absurdity of this tactic, the Chinese regime may just be tempted enough if such a strategy could resolve two of China’s current nuisances — voices of dissent in the Legislative Council and the previous failure to implement Article 23.
Strategy Three: The “Boiling Frog Effect”
Article 23 is not yet implemented, but the dystopian world that the protesters pictured in 2003 is already becoming reality. Regular citizens have been persecuted for “sedition” for sharing their views on social media or participating in legal protests; workers face retaliation for taking part in strikes; corporations are pressured to publicly side with the government’s stance; employees who have the “wrong” political views are fired; schools have been closely monitored for teaching material; protest-supporting fundraisers were framed for money laundering; a retweet or like may lead to persecution, under a colonial-era law. Only now have Hong Kongers woken up to their new reality — although the Basic Law technically protects citizens’ rights to speak, rally, march, demonstrate, and go on strike, the government could enfeeble civil rights by bending antiquated laws and legal provisions. The frequent abuse of law enforcement power on a small scale, such as improper arrests and police violence, is desensitizing the public and the international community. In a few years, Hong Kong will become unrecognizable. This is indeed a clever play on Beijing’s part to slowly strip away Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom, without causing much international attention.
Counter-Strategies Against Beijing’s Brinkmanship
Beijing’s overarching goal is to hollow out Hong Kong but, at the same time, avoid major backlash from the international community, which could spell the end of the privileged global status of Hong Kong not granted to other Chinese cities. Beijing also aims at preventing single incidents that could cascade down into mass protests as seen in 2003, 2014, and 2019; and eliminating any resistance forces from within Hong Kong’s legislature. The tactics outlined above are typical in a game of brinkmanship.
In response, Hong Kongers in Hong Kong and on the so-called “international frontline” must know their strengths and bargaining chips on this negotiating table with Beijing.
Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong is a city with transparency and free flow of information. Hong Kongers need to make a case to the world that the protests are not acts of terrorism. Some suggestions include comparing the Hong Kong protests to similar struggles in 20 or so other counties in the world at the present time, none of which were classified as terrorism; collecting a large amount of concrete evidence of the disproportionate use of force by the Hong Kong police; and showing how enacting Chinese national laws in Hong Kong will end the city’s autonomy and spell disaster for international community‘s interests.
The Legislative Council is the institution that can counteract Beijing’s “boiling frog” strategy and to keep Hong Kongers’ hope alive in the system. Those who plan to run for legislative office must be prepared to be disqualified from running. If only individuals are banned, there need to be alternative candidates as back-up plans. However, if and when the disqualification process is applied broadly to entire camps of candidates (for example, all who object to Article 23), the pro-democracy camp must make a strong case to the Hong Kong and global public that this is the endgame for Hong Kong democracy. Then the incumbent popularly elected legislators will hold the internationally recognized mandate from the public and serve as the last resistance.
These recommendations delineates how the slogan “if we burn, you burn with us,” often seen in the protests, may play out in the game of international relations. If the national security laws are “passed” by a legislature that is jury-rigged in this manner, or if related national laws are directly implemented in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers should signal clearly to the world that it goes way beyond the promised “one country, two systems.” Crossing this red line by Beijing should be seen by the world as a blunt violation of its promised autonomy to Hong Kongers. At that time, if the international community led by the United States and the United Kingdom decided to revoke the “non-sovereignty entity” status of Hong Kong and regard the SAR as an ordinary Chinese city, it shouldn’t come as a surprise.
Dr. Simon Shen is the Founding Chairman of GLOs (Glocal Learning Offices), an international relations start-up company. He also serves as an adjunct associate professor in the University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and associate director of the Master of Global Political Economy Programme of the CUHK. The author acknowledges Jean Lin, Coco Ho, Chris Wong, Michelle King, and Alex Yap for their assistance in this piece.
▶️ 高度自治 vs 全面管治
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principle principal 在 Adam Bradshaw Youtube 的最佳解答
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principle principal 在 Louise Page Youtube 的最佳貼文
歡迎大家收看「容易混淆英文字」特輯!記住今集要睇到最尾呀,有份驚喜送俾大家。
立即登記參加一天免費試堂:
http://www.beacon.com.hk/oneday/2017/06/form/od0a.php?sid=14
如果大家鍾意這短片可以俾個"Like" 啊,嚟緊呢個頻道會有更多不同類型嘅短片!
各位DSE同學仔,暑假見!
Louise Page & her Elite Task Force
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principle principal 在 Daphne LE Youtube 的精選貼文
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Turquoise Pen Holder
Extra Fine Principle Nib (D. Leonardt EF Principal)
Flexible Shorthand Nib (Leonardt Steno 40)
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5ml Bottle of Black Calligraphy Ink
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principle principal 在 How to Pronounce Principle and Principal - Facebook 的推薦與評價
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