關於 civil law system中文 ，我們在網路上蒐集到這些相關的討論、資訊與評價

大學對你而言，是什麼模樣？
大學生活，真的如你想得這麼一般嗎？

橫跨成功大學十大學院四十六個科系的營隊
「大學生活體驗營」開始報名了！
還在對自己未來的志向感到迷惘嗎？
大學生活體驗營有上百位成大在學生
陪你們一起剝開迷霧，走出迷途！
這個暑假，跟我們一起「拾起」未來的自己吧👍🏼

感謝成大的侯學長提供「成大科系餐」
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🏫 俐媽英文教室—大學科系篇：
❤️ 文學院 College of Liberal Arts
•中文系（中國文學系）
Department of Chinese Literature
•外文系（外國文學系）
Department of Foreign Languages and Literature
•歷史系（歷史學系）Department of History
•台文系（台灣文學系）
Department of Taiwanese Literature

🧡 理學院 College of Science
•數學系（數學系）
Department of Mathematics
•化學系（化學系）
Department of Chemistry
•物理系（物理學系）
Department of Physics
•地科系（地球科學系）
Department of Earth Sciences
•光電系（光電科學與工程學系系）
Department of Photonics

💛 管理學院 College of Management
•會計系（會計學系）
Department of Accountancy
•統計系（統計學系）
Department of Statistics
•企管系（企業管理學系）
Department of Business Administration
•交管系（交通管理學系）
Department of Transportation and Communication Management Science
•工資管系（工業與資訊管理學系）
Department of Industrial and Information Management

💚 工學院College of Engineering
•機械系（機械工程學系）
Department of Mechanical Engineering
•化工系（化學工程學系）
Department of Chemical Engineering
•土木系（土木工程學系）
Department of Civil Engineering
•材料系（材料科學及工程學系）
Department of Materials Science and Engineering
•水利系（水利及海洋工程學系）
Department of Hydraulic and Ocean Engineering
•工科系（工程科學系）
Department of Engineering Science
•系統系（系統及船舶機電工程學系）
Department of System and Naval Mechatronic Engineering
•航太系（航空太空工程學系）
Department of Aeronautics and Astronautics
•資源系（資源工程學系）
Department of Resources Engineering
•環工系（環境工程學系）
Department of Environmental Engineering
•醫工系（生物醫學工程學系）
Department of Biomedical Engineering
•測量系（測量及空間資訊學系）
Department of Geomatics
•能源學程（能源國際學士學位學程）
International Bachelor Degree Program on Energy

💙 電機資訊學院College of Electrical Engineering and Computer Science
•電機系（電機工程學系）
Department of Electrical Engineering
•資訊系（資訊工程學系）
Department of Computer Science and Information Science

💜 社會科學院 College of Social Science
•政治系（政治學系）
Department of Political Science
•經濟系（經濟學系）
Department of Economics
•法律系（法律學系）
Department of Law
•心理系（心理學系）
Department of Psychology

🖤 規劃與設計學院 College of Planning and Design
•建築系（建築學系）
Department of Architecture
•都計系（都市計劃學系）
Department of Urban Planning
•工設系（工業設計學系）
Department of Industrial Design

🤍 生物科學與科技學院College of Bioscience and Biotechnology
•生科系（生命科學系）
Department of Life Sciences
•生技系（生物科技與產業科學系）
Department of Biotechnology and Bioindustry Sciences

🤎 醫學院College of Medicine
•藥學系（藥學系）
Department of Pharmacy
•護理系（護理學系）
Department of Nursing
•牙醫系（牙醫學系）
Department of Dentistry
•物治系（物理治療學系）
Department of Physical Therapy
•職治系（職能治療學系）
Department of Occupation Therapy
•醫學系（醫學系）
Department of Medicine

💟 第十學院 CollegeX
•不分系（全校不分系學士學位學程）
Cross College Elite Program
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這是成大所有科系聯合一起辦的營隊，
俐媽的學生可以知道成大有什麼科系，
及早了解、準備充足💪🏻💪🏻💪🏻
.
#俐媽英文教室
#俐媽英文教室大學科系篇
#台大明明的孩子超前佈局

「#基本法」保障香港 170 多年來的 #普通法 制度將會延續，不過，這部特區憲制文件，本身又以甚麼法系編成？曾任香港中文大學法律系講師，後任教授的 Ann Jordan，1997 年曾在「康奈爾國際法雜誌」發表文章，指將 #社會主義民法體系（socialist civil law system）的要素，強加於香港的普通法法律體系，是這部香港特區最高法律的「不幸之處」。

詳細全文：
https://bit.ly/2C9xSqX

延伸專題：
【陶傑：其實早已打烊】
https://bit.ly/2yxN93n
【「國家安全」：上世紀的落伍概念？】
https://bit.ly/2LRXFWe
【陶傑：未立 23 條，先廢 22 條】
https://bit.ly/3bsX0Wv

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【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】

***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated，將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像：以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文（https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/）翻譯成英文，鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演，在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***

中文精簡版本：https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/

Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.

In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.

The possibility of realizing legislative majority

Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.

The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?

Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.

Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.

Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority

To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.

While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.

Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.

Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.

Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP

What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.

Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.

The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.

Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution

Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.

Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.

The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.

All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.

https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw