我不是執政黨的一員,但在外交上,我言所當言,該批評的我會批評,但該捍衛的,我也會捍衛。
尤其是談到台灣的民主價值時,我向來認為,這是台灣社會的最大公約數,理應不分朝野。
蕭美琴 Bi-khim Hsiao大使日前在「全美議會交流理事會」(American Legislative Exchange Council, ALEC)發表演講,我看了完整影片,感觸很深。
ALEC基本上是全美各州州議員組成的跨黨派組織,過去我在美國工作時,便曾經籌組新墨西哥州(New Mexico State)議會訪團訪問台灣。
當然,州議員不是聯邦參眾議員,就好比市議員跟立委的政治重要性不同。州議員是非常地方的,正如蕭大使在演講中所說,她在台灣的從政起點也是來自地方,All politics are local(所有的政治都來自地方)。
但全美各州州議員的地方政務,向來是我們駐美各辦事處的工作重點。每一年,我們駐美外交人員都會進洽州議會通過友我決議案,內容不外乎支持台灣參與國際組織、推動台美雙邊經貿及教育交流等。
蕭美琴在演講中有三點讓我很感動。
第一,她言必稱Taiwan。
她並沒有說她來自Republic of China。
這很好啊!我們對外,就是Taiwan,多講Taiwan的名, #以台灣為名 。Taiwan很好聽,一點都不尷尬。
如果可以,我希望我們全部的大使或代表在演講時,盡量只用Taiwan自稱。
第二,蕭美琴說,中共的生氣門檻很低,連台灣選手在奧運場上打敗中國選手,他們都會生氣。
語畢,全場大笑。
全美各州的議員聽著,心中何嘗不明白。
就因為無論台灣做什麼,中共都會生氣,那為何台灣有些人,卻總是對中共展現軟弱態度,老是怕中共生氣呢?甚至,為了怕中共生氣,一廂情願地說:「只要有 #九二共識,中共就不會生氣了」
是這樣嗎?
我就是在說 #江啟臣 跟 #羅智強 們。
江啟臣昨天在中國時報刊半版廣告,說「貨出去,人進來,發大財」。
親愛的國民黨,「貨出去,人進來」,不如「飛彈撤下來」。究竟何時,國民黨才會開始懂了?
第三,蕭美琴說,如果美國社會質疑孔子學院,那台灣絕對是最好學中文的選項。在台灣,美國學生在推特上要推什麼都可以,不會因為一則推文就去坐牢。
台灣的言論自由,台灣使用社群媒體的自由,台灣在民主及人權的價值高地,這些都是我們跟中國之間天高地遠的差距所在。
我不是執政黨的一員,我也會批評執政黨這裡做不好哪裡做不對。
但台灣的外交不應分朝野。
如果藍營人士眼睛老是只盯著中南海的鼻孔,卻不願走到國際看看這個世界,甚至三不五時做些送花籃給駐外代表的無聊舉動,那永遠不會得到多數台灣人民的支持。
「貨出去,人進來」,不如「飛彈撤下來」。台灣人民,要的就是那麼簡單而已。
國民黨黨主席候選人們,別老是看著中南海。
台灣,才是我們的家。
同時也有1部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過8,320的網紅Campus TV, HKUSU 香港大學學生會校園電視,也在其Youtube影片中提到,Motion: 香港大學應在必修的中文增補課程教授簡體字 / Simplified Chinese characters should be taught in Practical Chinese courses of HKU The Annual Debate is a special Coun...
local council中文 在 黃之鋒 Joshua Wong Facebook 的最佳解答
【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】
***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated,將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像:以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文(https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/)翻譯成英文,鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演,在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***
中文精簡版本:https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/
Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.
In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.
The possibility of realizing legislative majority
Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.
The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?
Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.
Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.
Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority
To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.
While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.
Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.
Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.
Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP
What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.
Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.
The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.
Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution
Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.
Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.
The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.
All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.
https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw
local council中文 在 *桑妮凱特‧說說話* 澳洲護理/移民/美食/世界旅行分享 Facebook 的最佳貼文
#澳洲公民考試
#澳洲公民典禮
#Citizenshipceremony
最近因為疫情,很多公民宣誓✊日期都被延後或是取消。
偏偏通過公民考試後沒宣誓不能成為公民,所以昨天看到澳洲🦘官網準備開始Online ceremony!!
大家可以期待一下唷🥰
🇦🇺 這是2019/7月的宣示典禮❤️
來澳洲不滿五年就正式移民成功覺得超Lucky!
因為澳洲規定拿綠卡PR滿一年,總澳洲居住時間滿四年才能申請公民。
所以我一滿四年馬上送出!好在很順利🙂
謝謝提姆一路真心相伴也盛裝出席,一月的土耳其之旅,七月的公民宣誓跟後來10月份的婚禮成了我2019重要大事👰
✅跟大家分享一下2019/4月考過公民考試的心得:
Passed my citizenship 🥰🎉
跟版友討論發現各州可能稍微不同(Email內容,不一定有條碼)
請以自己手上收到文件去準備囉🙋
#坎培拉
#ACT
#公民考試
#Citizenship
#考題流程分享
1500預約,剛剛考完考試,⌚️考試比練習簡單多了!作答約5分鐘可完成。
預約時間前15分鐘才可以刷預約條碼(email給你的文件第一面)領號碼牌。
首先叫號後到櫃台。
會先拍照(不知道要幹嘛但還是美美的去就對了😊)
然後他會請你拿出正版文件給他檢查。
我是線上申請,剛剛當下我給了他很滿意:
Ps.我的租房合約帶到影印版可是他沒說什麼可能因為駕照上都有就好👍🏻
✅澳洲駕照,台灣護照,台灣身份證的英文譯本,租房合約,台灣英文版出生證明跟全家英文戶籍謄本。
但我手上還有很多文件都帶著避免他們問。
接下來問你問題:
1.請告訴我你的英文全名跟怎麼拼?
2.你在其他國家有沒犯罪紀錄或其他案件?
3.這次申請中是否包含其他家人一起?
4.接下來半年內是否有出國計畫?日期是?
回答完審核官會簡單說明考試流程要答對15題,跟教室在哪裡,接著根據指示就去考試了👩⚕️
電腦機考,在一個房間有一排電腦共四台。
考完最後送出,成績直接在螢幕顯示
接著舉手🙋 考官在我後面的玻璃門後看到會進房間看成績,接著才能關掉視窗回家。
從昨天開始準備,建議大家要把群組裡的中文版本跟英文擺在一起對照看細節。
大綱則是建議熟讀英文版本,正式考題的用詞都比較生活化不像書面,所以可以用common sense 回答❤️
做完正式題材後面20題後下載App練習題目。
App會有過時跟錯誤答案,但還是可以測驗自己對內容熟悉度。
我用的2個App:Australian Test 跟 Citizenship test 。
題目:
澳洲國旗哪三個顏色
原住民國旗哪三個顏色
澳洲幾個洲跟領地
憲法哪年制定
Which country came to Australia For the early settlement -英國跟愛爾蘭
誰可以有投票幾歲?
什麼是言論自由
Who is the leader of a local council?
How to change the constitution-referendum
身為公民在海外的權利?-辦理緊急護照
1788那年誰帶了罪犯抵達澳洲
其他記不得
朋友昨天考被問到一題
大家記得
Each state had its own constitution and its own parliament 是對的 👍🏻
當初申請考試我準備的文件有這些:
https://sunycat.pixnet.net/blog/post/463785050-%5B移民%5D-線上申請澳洲公民小攻略-文件%2B表格準
有需要的可以看看我之前文章
沒有被要求補件🥰
祝大家公民考試都順利唷❤️
🎊🎊🎊🎊🎊
local council中文 在 Campus TV, HKUSU 香港大學學生會校園電視 Youtube 的最佳貼文
Motion: 香港大學應在必修的中文增補課程教授簡體字 / Simplified Chinese characters should be taught in Practical Chinese courses of HKU
The Annual Debate is a special Council Meeting held for the purpose of involving Union Members in the Council's discussion of University and student affairs. It takes place publicly which does not only allow Members to observe the proceedings of the Union Council but also to take part in the debate. The Motion this year concerns the compulsory Chinese Language courses for local students which is not only closely related to the academic interest of students but also the debate of Chinese Language culture. We hope to have your voice heard in the Annual Debate.
周年辯論為香港大學學生會評議會為讓會員參與校政學生事務等議題討論的特別會議。會議於開放空間舉行,讓各學生會基本會員不單能了解評議會會議流程;更能就議案各紓己見。本年議案涉及本地生必修之中文課程,影響學生學術表現外更論及中文文化的議題。期望在周年辯論中聽到你的聲音。
![post-title](https://i.ytimg.com/vi/MHl9YzaZozs/hqdefault.jpg)
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