I have recently perused Nicholas Kristof’s NYT piece “China’s Man in Washington, Named Trump”(https://nyti.ms/3h2JXh8). One paragraph in particular caught my attention: “A joke in China suggests that Trump’s Chinese name is Chuan Jianguo, or “Build-the-Country Trump.” That’s because Build-the-Country is a common revolutionary name among Communist patriots, and it’s mockingly suggested that Trump’s misrule of the United States is actually bolstering Xi’s regime.”
Kristoff also avows that since Trump’s ascension to presidency, the American nation became highly polarized. This is reflected in the current administration’s policies on climate change, foreign relations with established U.S. allies, and COVID-19 prevention, all of which are rather ineffective. It also seems like Mr. Trump and his team diverged from the traditional priorities, including promoting free trade, human rights, and other quintessentially American values. As described thoroughly by John Bolton, all these factors contributed to the declining standing of the U.S. in global politics.
What is more, many people fall prey to CCP’s propaganda and its interpretations of Trump’s actions, which only enhances China’s reputation.
But that might not exactly be the case.
The CCP apparently failed to utilize the window of opportunity created by the ineptness of the Trump administration, as China could have grown to the position of a leader by filling in the void left by the U.S.
During the 2016 APEC Ministerial Meeting in Lima, Peru, Xi Jinping and his team actively supported the plans to establish the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific, or FTAAP. In contrast, the United States withdrew its signature from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) in early 2017. Coupled with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank (AIIB), this move bolstered China’s capacity to influence global investments and trade, high-tech mergers and acquisitions, and, overall, expand its geostrategic influence on the entire globe.
At the same time, various propaganda films about great power competition, military industry, and science and technology surged all at once, and gained remarkable following around the world.
All this provided a window of opportunity for the CCP to slowly change its course. Around the same time, the distrust for POTUS among U.S. allies’ reached its apex. According to polls conducted by the Pew Research Center, the distrust for the U.S. president in the U.K. reached 75%, 72% in Japan, 70% in Australia, and stunning 86% in France.
Had the C.C.P,. begun to open up at that time, or at least resumed the governance style of the Hu-Wen administration, it could have reaped the benefits of promoting liberalism where the U.S. failed to deliver. It was the time for Beijing to gradually enhance freedom of speech domestically, pursue sustainable infrastructural projects, gradually reform unfair barriers to trade, transform its S.O.E.s, strengthen protections for private ownership, and vitalize its start-ups and enterprises.
Moreover, were China to cease the genocide in East Turkestan and refrain from cracking down on Hong Kong's semi-autonomy, it would have greatly enhanced its global international image. Additionally, if paired with slow but steady reforms, Beijing’s respect for sovereignty of its peoples would have attracted a large amount of foreign investment, which in turn would have continued to buttress the country’s growth.
It is China prerogative to remain idle.
It might still be possible for Chinese “Dream” to come true.
Yet, a historic window of opportunity is now closed.
Xi assumed the tools of proscribing and stalling, which are completely antithetical to the aforementioned window of opportunity.
Today, China is more authoritarian, less flexible, and fully deprived of horizontal accountability. Its reliance on wolf warrior diplomacy backfired: for example, the Swedish parliament sought to expel the Chinese ambassador to Stockholm. Also, Prague, the capital of Czechia, terminated its sister-city agreement with Shanghai and instead signed a new one with Taipei. Last but not least, we ought not to forget about the recent fiasco in the relations with the United States who ordered the shutdown of China’s consulate in Houston. All of this took its toll on China’s reputation.
Its international standing and inability to replace the U.S. as the major global power are not the only issues China is currently facing.
As it experiences multiple domestic and international shocks, China struggles to combat the COVID-19 pandemic and tame the disastrous floods of Yangtze River. The swarm of locusts of biblical proportions is also crippling Beijing’s institutional capacity and may soon lead to food shortages. In fact, the precarity of food supply further diminishes the level of trust for Chinese authorities.
In 2019, the Pew Research Center conducted a public opinion survey to examine the international views of China. In the U.S., Argentina, the U.K., Canada, Germany, and Ukraine, only about 30% of respondents claim a favorable view of China.
As the COVID-19 pandemic rages in the U.S., as many as 73% of U.S. respondents view China unfavorably.
Recently, the C.C.P. is losing its focus by continuously shifting targets. In fact, I believe there is no need for the C.C.P.to rely on nationalistic appeals, since in this new century values, business relations, and fair competition are all far more important than greater than delusive blood ties.
China lies only 130 kilometers away from us. Of course, we welcome dialogue and seek to avoid misjudgments. But we also distinguish between the C.C.P. and China. While we do welcome dialogue, but we will not be coerced to talk under unjust preconditions or in fear.
The only fair prerequisites are those of reciprocity, mutual respect as well as fairness and openness with respect for the rule of law.
Source: Pew Research Center
最近看到紐約時報中文版的一篇文章
<美國的川普,中國的「川建國」>,其中一小段是這樣的
「在中國,人們戲稱川普的中文名字是川建國。那是因為建國是共產黨愛國者中一個普遍的革命人名。它在諷刺地暗示川普對美國的治理不當實際上是在鞏固習近平的政權。」
裡面也提到,川普在任的幾年,國家更分裂,對於氣候變遷,傳統美國盟友,乃至於疫情處理等都相當拙劣,對於美國傳統的自由貿易、人權等價值也基本上都沒有太大興趣。這些方針,導致美國在世界的評價降低,波頓的新書也多有描述。
除此之外,許多不幸相信中共宣傳,又或者是中共圈養的小粉紅,特別故意愛宣傳川普增強中國的威望。
但這不是真的。
中共完全沒有掌握美國做得不夠好的地方,去增強其在世界的領導力。
在2016年時,秘魯的亞太峰會舉行期間,習近平政權爭取(RCEP)及亞太自由貿易區(FTAAP)談判;對比2017年初,美國剛宣布退出TPP,加上中國到「一帶一路」和亞洲基礎設施投資銀行,中國當時在世界全面發揮投資貿易、高科技併購還有其地緣戰略的影響力。
也是那個時候,各種的大國崛起、大國軍工、大國科技的宣傳影片此起彼落,似乎正準備要在世界舞台發光發熱。
這曾經是中共慢慢轉向的一個機會之窗。彼時(2017)美國盟友對美國總統的不信任度達到歷史新高,根據皮尤研究中心的資訊,英國對於美國總統的不信任度達到75%、日本72% 澳洲70% 法國更高達86%
如果那時中共開始有限度的改革,對內放寬言論自由,或者至少維持在胡溫當時的水中,對外追求有責任的基礎建設,逐步緩慢減低不公平的貿易壁壘,對於國有企業改革,增強私營企業、新創企業的活力。
停止對新疆迫害,不干預香港自治,不僅國際形象會大幅改善,哪怕是緩慢但是穩健的改革,也會讓大量吸引外資,讓中國的活力持續前進。
哪怕是什麼都不做也好
那或許有這麽一點可能性,中國「夢」是可以前行的
但是歷史機緣的大門已經關上。
習、禁、停、放棄了這個機會之窗,徹底的走向相反的方向。
更專制、更沒有彈性,更沒有任何制衡的力量。各種戰狼外交,讓瑞典議員提案驅逐中國大使,捷克布拉格市長與台北簽訂姊妹是,就解散上海與該市關係、被美國關閉領事館、各種讓中國形象低下的事情,中共都沒有少做。
中共不但完全沒有辦法取代美國,在多重國內外的衝擊之下,又是瘟疫,又是超大水患,緊接著蝗害,還有進來的糧食不足問題,正在面臨巨大的瓶頸。
而糧食的命脈,卻恰恰又在對他最不信任,對中共價值最反對的國家聯盟
根據皮尤研究中心:Pew Research Center2019調查各國對中國的喜好度,美國、阿根廷、英國、加拿大、德國、烏克蘭等,對於中國的喜好度都在30%上下
而2020疫情後美國對於中國的不信任度,更高達73%。
最近中共在演習,又要玩轉移目標的手段,對於中共,其實不必再有民族主義的同情,因為新的世紀,價值、商業模式、公平競爭的制度大於血緣幻想。
中國離我們只有130公里的距離,我們當然歡迎對話,避免誤判。但我們同時也區分中共與中國,歡迎對話,但不在前提、條件、恐懼之下對話。
如果真的要有前提,那就是對等、尊重,還有公平公開法治的方式會晤。
資料來源:皮尤研究中心:Pew Research Center
(美國著名的民調機構和智庫機構,https://www.pewresearch.org/)
同時也有10000部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過2,910的網紅コバにゃんチャンネル,也在其Youtube影片中提到,...
「mutual agreement中文」的推薦目錄:
- 關於mutual agreement中文 在 陳冠廷 Kuan-Ting Chen Facebook 的最讚貼文
- 關於mutual agreement中文 在 容海恩 Eunice Yung Facebook 的最佳貼文
- 關於mutual agreement中文 在 Howtindog's Channel Facebook 的最佳解答
- 關於mutual agreement中文 在 コバにゃんチャンネル Youtube 的精選貼文
- 關於mutual agreement中文 在 大象中醫 Youtube 的精選貼文
- 關於mutual agreement中文 在 大象中醫 Youtube 的最佳貼文
- 關於mutual agreement中文 在 【3秒搞懂WTO/RTA】 相互承認協定Mutual... - 中華經濟研究 ... 的評價
mutual agreement中文 在 容海恩 Eunice Yung Facebook 的最佳貼文
葉太是前高官,熟知政府運作和昔日議會的資料及紀錄。可惜政府於是次修例的解說過程中,並沒有人像葉太般能清晰、有理有節地指出泛民的謬誤,在此感謝葉太的敢言,讓市民看清真相。
#香港幸好有葉太
Dear friends, an English summary of the key points I made in the LegCo adjournment debate is set out below:
1.Rebutting the pan democrats’ objections to the government’s fugitive offenders amendment legislation, I pointed out that arising from two criminal cases (the Telford Gardens murder case and the Cheung Tse-keung kidnap case) in which the suspects fled to mainland China after committing the offences, Martin Lee Chu-ming, then a Member of the Legislator, moved a motion in LegCo on 9 December 1998 urging the government to discuss and conclude an agreement with Beijing on rendition arrangements between mainland China and the SAR, so as to restore the public’s confidence in the SAR’s judicial jurisdiction”. The wording is as follows:
“That this Council deeply regrets that, while the cases involving the kidnapping of two business tycoons in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) and the murder of five persons in the
Telford Gardens, which are being handled in the Mainland in accordance with the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China, have caused widespread concern among Hong Kong people, the SAR Government has not tried its utmost to seek the return of those who are suspected of violating the law in the SAR by the Basic Law; this Council also urges the SAR Government to expeditiously discuss and conclude an agree-ment with the Central People’s Government, on the basis of internationally agreed principles, on rendition arrangements between the Mainland and the SAR, so as to restore the public’s confidence in the SAR’s judicial jurisdiction.”
2.All the legislators from the Democratic Parry supported this motion. Who made an about-turn in opposing the government’s amendment legislation
to facilitate the rendition of fugitive offenders and mutual legal assistance in criminal matters with mainland China? Who have been lying to the people of Hong Kong?
3.As Secretary for Security, I had, on 3 December 198, reported to LegCo’s Security Panel the government’s plan to conclude an agreement on the rendition of fugitive offenders with mainland China. Then Chief Secretary Anson Chan undertook to expedite action to reach an agreement with the mainland.
4. All decisions about rendition are ultimately made by the courts. Two recent examples: a high court in New Zealand rejected an extradition request from China to extradite an ethnic Korean New Zealand citizen suspected of murdering a sex worker in Shanghai on the ground that the court did not believe that he would have access to “fair trial” in China. A court in Scotland rejected an extradition request from Taiwan to extradite a British national accused of killing a newspaper agent by drink driving on the ground that the court did not believe that he would
have non-discriminatory treatment in prison.
5. The Financial Action Task Force established under the auspices of G20 had described the lack of rendition arrangement and agreement on mutual legal assistance in criminal matters with mainland China as a “significant deficit” in Hong Kong’s fight against money laundering and terrorist financing.
6. On the question of pressure on judges to kowtow to Beijing, why should judges fear pressure? They are appointed by the Chief Executive with approval by the Legislative Council. They are well trained; well paid and have security of tenure. They are only accountable for the judgments they made which would go down in the common law as part of the
jurisprudence on extradition. They are not accountable to Beijing.
7. On the need to formally “withdraw” the fugitive offenders bill, I pointet out that then Chief Executive Tung Chee-hua used wording similar to that of the current administration in announcing the postponement of the second reading debate of the national security bill on 7 July 2003. On 2 October 2003, then Secretary for Security Ambrose Lee wrote to House Committee Chairperson Selina Chow to explain that to give effect to Mr.Tung’s announcement of “withdrawal” of the bill on 5 September, he would not give notice under LegCo Rules of Procedure to resume second reading debate of the bill within the current term of the Legislative Council.
8. Thus it is clear that the current administration followed the same wording and procedure as in 2003. Clear indication that second reading debate
would not be resumed in the rest of the legislative term is effective “withdrawal”. Insistence on withdrawal is merely a ploy adopted by the opposition to dial up pressure on the administration to undermine its ability to govern.
9.The orderly demonstrations carried out recently by large numbers of of Hong Kong people fully testify to the abundance of rights and freedoms in Hong Kong. But I strongly condemn the outbreak of violence after the mass protest on 9 June, the violent attack on the Police on 12 June, the repeated actions taken by unruly protesters to lay siege to the Police Headquarters, the Immigration Tower, the Revenue Tower and the Justice Place. These protesters have become urban “bandits”, disrupting social order and damaging Hong Kong’s overseas reputation as a safe city. The attacks on Police Headquarters, with a view to undermining Police morale, are particularly vicious. These protesters have committed multiple offences and should be brought to justice.
-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\-\
(中文版本發言全文)
【誰是第一人敦促特區政府與內地商討移交逃犯協議?讓市民看清真相】
多謝代理主席女士,我發言是支持張華峰議員的議案,我完全同意張議員議案指出,政府現時當務之急是盡快恢復社會秩序,穩定營商環境,採取及時的應對措施 ,令市民可以恢復正常的生活。我亦很高興藉這個休會辯論的機會,向市民講真話,講清講楚,告訴市民那些人一直講大話,瞞騙市民!可惜尹兆堅議員不在席,我想告訴所有的泛民議員,究竟誰是第一人敦促特區政府與內地商討移交逃犯協議,以及刑事司法互助安排呢?正是李柱銘議員!
1998年香港出現了兩宗轟動社會的刑事案件,第一宗是德福花園的「五屍命案」,風水師李育輝殺了五名女士後逃到內地,被逮捕及處決;第二宗是「張子強案」,張子強涉嫌綁架和囤積軍火,同樣逃到內地,然後被逮捕及處決。當時立法會非常震驚,要求特區政府盡快與內地商討刑事司法互助安排,例如1998年12月3 日,我擔任保安局局長,向立法會保安事務委員會交代,要與內地訂明有關安排,並與今日的特區政府一樣,承諾所有安排必須符合「雙重犯罪」原則、指定罪行、不得再移交第三國家的保障、死刑及政治罪行或受政治迫害一律豁免移交的保障,就此,根據保安事務委員會會議文件編號CB(2)748/98-99(02) 第十段有清楚說明:「鑑於公眾對近日張子強和李育輝等案件的關注,亦正如政務司司長所承諾,政府會盡力加快工作,以期早日與內地就此重要事項達成協議。」當時政務司司長就是陳方安生女士。
接下來,李柱銘先生亦在1998年12月9 日動議議案。李議員動議的議案內容如下:「由於兩名富商在香港特別行政區(“特 區”)被綁架案及德福花園五屍命案均在內地法院以《中華人民共和國刑法》審理,引起港人極大關注,但特區政府卻未盡全力爭取將在特區境內涉嫌違法的人士,交還特區法院審理,以捍衛《基本法 》賦予特區的司法管轄權,對此,本會深表遺憾;同時,本會促請特區政府以國際社會公認的原則為基礎,盡快就中港兩地移交疑犯的安排與中央人民政 府進行商討及達成協議,恢復港人對特區司法管轄權的信心。」
因此,我真的要問問尹兆堅議員,究竟是誰人表演「四川變臉」?李柱銘去美國告狀時,有沒有告訴美國人他是提出修例的第一人?他當年不斷敦促特區政府和內地達成協議!我則堂堂正正光明正大地多次到北京開會,商討移交逃犯協議和刑事司法互助安排,會議後每次都是光明磊落向本會匯報。為何對這些事實你們全部失憶?是誰欺騙市民?拍攝影片誤導市民,宣傳香港人如何肉隨砧板上,隨時像動物一樣被移送內地!
事實上,所有案例都證明移交逃犯是需要經過法庭冗長而複雜的程序。最近新西蘭的高等法院否決移交一名韓裔新西蘭公民,該人士涉嫌在上海謀殺一名性工作者,而這案件已由2011年審理至今。蘇格蘭的法庭也拒絕了台灣一個引渡要求,有關一名英國人在台灣醉酒駕駛,撞死一名派報紙的職員。由此可見,最終決定權在法庭手上,並非行政長官一人決定。亦有指法官備受壓力,試問法官受高深教育,良好的司法訓練,身受納稅人供給不錯的報酬,他們當然必須承擔責任。我們每個人都有壓力,法官承擔責任,幫助香港人解決法律問題,是他們應有的責任。因此,代理主席,我認為應該就此向市民講清講楚,是誰人不斷向市民講大話?誤導市民!將這條應該做的法例,抹黑成一條所謂「送中」的惡法!
亦看看國際社會怎麼說,Financial Action Task Force, 即G20集團轄下的「財務行動特別組織」,素來批評香港與內地沒有移交逃犯協議和刑事司法互助安排。過往,他們直指這是一個significant deficit ,即一個「重大缺憾」。近來,可能因為要和應香港反對修例的聲音,則改為 legal shortcoming,即一個「法律上的缺憾」。不過,我們仍然需要完善這些法律,所以政府不撤回是正確的。那些要求行政會議成員辭職的人,全部皆作出不公平的指責。這條例本身完全沒有錯,但大家都同意,政府在宣傳和解釋這條條例方面,乃至為市民反駁種種謊言的工作,做得嚴重不足。
說到撤回,我們看看當年政府處理23條的時候所用的語言。2003年7月7日,時任行政長官董建華先生發表聲明:「我即時召開行政會議特別會議。經過詳細商討後,基於自由黨的立場,我們決定將條例草案押後恢復二讀,並在未來一段時間加強向市民解釋修訂案內容。」其實這個方針與現時政府無異,一樣是將其押後並且加強解釋,並沒有表示撤回。再看看我的接任人李少光局長向內務委員會主席周梁淑怡女士致函的內容,信函的日期是2003年10月2日,李局長寫道:「為在程序上落實前文所提及,行政長官會同行政會議的決定,我現確認我不擬根據《議事規則》第 54(5)條發出預告,以在本屆立法會任期內恢復該草案的二讀辯論。草案因此會根據《議事規則》第 11(4)條及《立法會條例》(第 542 章)第 9(4)條,在本屆立法會任期完結時失效。」即是和現在特區政府的說法一樣,繼續開放式的諮詢去解釋這條條例,沒有時間表,不發出預告恢復二讀,任由這條例「自然死亡」,實質上等同不會再推動修例,等同撤回。
為什麼當時沒有要求撤回的爭論呢?我認為今天有人強烈要求撤回,根本別有用心!為了找理由不斷衝擊政府部門,除了衝擊警察總部之外,又衝擊入境事務大樓、稅務大樓,今天亦有超過100人衝擊律政中心。他們的目的到底與這條條例有什麼關係呢?其實只不過是用「撤回」作一個藉口,不斷擾亂香港秩序,甚至令香港在國際社會失色,令許多希望到香港做生意或旅遊的人,感到香港是一個不安全的城市,他們的用心實在非常惡毒!「撤回」是一個要求律政司下台的藉口,假如律政司下台,他們就會要求整個特區政府領導班子總辭,所有支持過修訂條例的行政會議成員、立法會議員,全部都應該總辭,不如讓泛民和黃之鋒接手特區政府,這就是他們的最終目的。代理主席,所以我一定要藉這個休會辯論的機會,向市民講清楚這背後的陰謀。
當然,我要強烈譴責近日這些示威人士衝擊警察總部。過去兩星期有大部分市民和平遊行,充分彰顯香港擁有高度自由,以及人權得到高度保障,這是我們香港人皆引以為榮的核心價值。不過,在這些和平的示威遊行之後,有些不法之徒聚眾衝擊政府部門,特別是衝擊警隊,他們的用心非常惡毒!他們知道警隊是維護香港治安和秩序最重要的支柱,他們就故意不斷打擊警隊的士氣,甚至侵犯他們的私隱,包括網上「起底」和 網上欺凌。昨晚市民在愛丁堡廣場和平集會後,有眾多穿黑衣的人士走入地鐵站,他們最後走到軍器廠街再次包圍警察總部。我見到一名正在上班的警員,他沒有戴口罩,光明正大地上班,但竟然被人追打!不過,他無畏無懼,直視這些示威者。其實這些人已經觸犯多項刑事罪行,包括襲警、非法集會、刑事毀壞,警方應該將他們繩之於法,不可以因為你「聲大」你「人多」就可以獲得特赦。
代理主席,就此我感到特別震驚,為何一位前政務司司長能夠說出特赦及釋放違法人士,此等嚴重衝擊法治的言論呢?我們一位前同事余黎青萍女士,她以英語寫了一篇非常感人的聲明,在我們前政務官的圈子裏流傳。她表示 disappointed by 這位前同事陳方安生的所作所為!我亦 disappointed by 民主黨的變臉與謊言!李柱銘到美國告狀,有否告知美國人,他是第一人支持與內地簽訂移交逃犯協議,和達至司法互助?這些真相應該告知市民。
代理主席,這些近日的示威者已經成為一股流寇,不斷去衝擊各個政府部門。我懷疑他們真正目的就是要拖垮政府,傷害我們整體市民的利益。因此,我懇請各位善良的市民,看清楚真相,不要支持這些破壞香港繁榮安定的壞分子,不要參加他們的集會,亦希望各位父母約束您們的子女,並解說給他們知道,和平示威沒有問題,但一遇到出現亂象,應該帶他們離開現場,以免他們身陷險境。
mutual agreement中文 在 Howtindog's Channel Facebook 的最佳解答
我已經好耐冇試過咁深受震撼. 最近中國有尐神父被教會要求退下來, 由不受教會認可的神父頂上. 由於此事, 陳日君爆seed, 走去見教宗, 佢自己亦出文表達了一些睇法. 其中精彩段落包括 (可能遲下會有中文翻譯流傳):
"Is it not good to try to find mutual ground to bridge the decades-long divide between the Vatican and China? But can there be anything really “mutual” with a totalitarian regime? Either you surrender or you accept persecution, but remaining faithful to yourself (can you imagine an agreement between St. Joseph and King Herod?)"
"So, do I think that the Vatican is selling out the Catholic Church in China? Yes, definitely, if they go in the direction which is obvious from all what they are doing in recent years and months."
"Am I the major obstacle in the process of reaching a deal between the Vatican and China? If that is a bad deal, I would be more than happy to be the obstacle."
mutual agreement中文 在 【3秒搞懂WTO/RTA】 相互承認協定Mutual... - 中華經濟研究 ... 的推薦與評價
【3秒搞懂WTO/RTA】☆ 相互承認協定Mutual Recognition Agreement, MRA 相互承認協定,就是透過雙邊或多邊協定來承認對方檢驗機構的報告,避免在進出口過程中驗了又驗 ... ... <看更多>