【After Winning Majority in LegCo: Beijing's Crackdown May Trigger International Intervention】
***感謝Hong Kong Columns - Translated,將我早前撰寫『議會過半想像:以「#國際攬炒」反制「臨立會2.0」』長文(https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.313299448762570/2887650867994069/)翻譯成英文,鼓勵國際社會關注立會選舉一旦過半的沙盤推演,在最惡劣形勢下的制衡策略。***
中文精簡版本:https://www.facebook.com/joshuawongchifung/photos/a.564294826996363/2888641404561682/
Hongkongers have experienced our revolution for over half a year. They no longer take a consequentialist view to the effectiveness of their movement as they did years ago, or waste time second-guessing the intentions and background of fellow activists. Following the defensive battles at CUHK and PolyU, November’s District Council election saw a great victory of unity. More marvellous is the union between peaceful and “valiant” protesters.
In the process of resisting tyranny, the people have realised that one cannot prioritize one strategy over another. This is also how the common goal of “35+” came into being—the hope that we will win over half of the seats in the Legislative Council (LegCo) this September, such that the political spectrum that represents the majority of Hongkongers is able to gain control of legislative decisions. The political clout of Hongkongers will increase if 35 or more seats are successfully secured on our side. It is certainly one vital step to achieve the five demands within the system.
The possibility of realizing legislative majority
Technically it is not unrealistic to win a majority even under the current undemocratic system. Back in the 2016 LegCo election, we already won 30 seats. In addition to the District Council (First) functional constituency seat that is already in the pocket of the pan-democrats, as long as the candidates in Kowloon East and New Territories West do not start infighting again, we could safely secure 33 seats based on the number of pan-dem votes in 2016.
The other 3 seats required to achieve a majority depend on democrats’ breakthrough among the functional constituencies by dispersing the resources of the Liaison Office. They also count on whether the turnout this September could exceed 71.2% — that of last year’s District Council elections. Some of the factors that could affect the turnout include: will the epidemic persist into the summer? Will there be potential violent repression of protests in the 2 weeks preceding the election? Will Hong Kong-US relations be affected by the downturn of the global economy?
Therefore, the ambition of “35+” is to be prioritised by the resistance as both a means and an end. I have already expressed my support for an intra-party primary at the coordination meeting. In the meantime, it is pleasing to see the ongoing debates reaching a consensus of maximising the seats among geographical constituencies in the upcoming election.
Whilst enthusiastic coordination, we should also assess the post-election landscape and gauge Beijing’s reactions: if we do not reach 35 seats, Hong Kong will be subject to tighter control and more severe repression by China; but if the democratic parties successfully form a majority in LegCo, CCP’s fears of a “constitutional crisis” would become imminent. Hence, the key questions are how the Pan-Democrats should deal with the volatile political situation in Hong Kong and how they are going to meet Beijing’s charge head-on.
Watching out for Beijing’s dismissal of LegCo after reaching majority
To take back control of LegCo such that it faithfully reflects the majority’s principles and needs is the definition of a healthy democracy. Recently, however, DAB’s Tam Yiu-chung has warned that the plan of the Pan-Dems to “usurp power” in the LegCo would only lead to Beijing’s forceful disqualification of certain members or the interpretation of the Basic Law. This proves that winning a majority in LegCo is not only a popular conception but also a realistic challenge that would get on the nerves of Beijing. Could Beijing accept a President James To in LegCo? These unknown variables must be addressed upon achieving a majority.
While there is no telltale sign as to Beijing’s exact strategy, we are already familiar with the way CCP manipulated the Basic Law in the past 4 years. Having experienced three waves of disqualifications in LegCo, twice kicked out of LegCo with my team, and thrice locked up in jail, I have no false hopes of an easy compromise from Beijing: they would not let Pan-Dems control LegCo for half a year and wait (as is the proper procedure) until after having negatived the Budget to dissolve the legislature, and thereby giving them an easy victory in the re-elections. The greater the Pan-Dems threaten Beijing’s rule in Hong Kong, the more likely that it will trigger Beijing’s repression.
Since the disqualification and arrest of lawmakers have already become “normalised”, one can even imagine the police stepping into the LegCo building to force Pan-Dems into voting. Neither is it beyond our imagination to expect the CCP to kick out all 70 lawmakers in a fit of rage and replace them with a provisional LegCo “2.0” [HKCT note: The first was from 25 Jan 1997 to 30 Jun 1998]. To depend on a majority that could lead to a chapter of a “new testament” for One Country, Two Systems is perhaps what many elites long for, but they are overly optimistic:for a ticket to the promised land will not be available at the Chief Executive election campaign a year and a half later.
Admittedly, the Pan-Dems cannot unilaterally initiate “Laam-chaau” [HKCT note: mostly translated into “scorched-earth” mentality or “mutual destruction”; some even translated into “If I burn, you burn with us”]. The most they can do is to force a standstill of the government, and not for long the LegCo will have been eliminated from the equation to make the wheels turn again. It all leaves the plan of “Negativing the motion → Dissolving LegCo → Re-election after re-election → the stepping down of Carrie Lam” merely as overly positive speculation, probably resulting from their overestimate of CCP's capacity for rational calculation. The Pan-Dems must guard their frontlines and recognise what the biggest threat from Hong Kong to China could be. In this case, should LegCo sessions be disrupted or suspended, the Pan-Dems would have to be well prepared to surmount the expected obstacles and prevent the disqualification crisis 4 years ago—a Catch-22 indeed.
Productive tension from global intervention: Using Laam-chaau against the CCP
What aggravates the CCP the most is the potential threat to Hong Kong’s unique status as the one and only “separate customs territory”. Any miscalculation will compromise its role as the Chinese economy’s “white gloves”. Imagine if CCP were to disqualify all 70 elected lawmakers and convene a meeting north of the Shenzhen River to pass a resolution to Hong Kong’s affairs (much like the Provisional Legislative Council “1.0" in 1997), how great will the shock be in a world with an effective Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act? However hard it is to predict the future one thing is certain: With the US presidential election just around the corner, blows to the separation of powers would not be tolerated, and the West would necessarily effect countermeasures against the Hong Kong government.
Beijing has been relying upon Hong Kong to navigate the international community for decades. While clamping down on the political freedom of the cosmopolitan city, Beijing desires to maintain the financial centre’s economic freedom. Hence, we started lobbying for the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act four years ago, and today we are determined to promote “Laam-chaau” on an international scale.
The will of the voters must be reflected in an election. If a “35+” legislature were to be dismissed and replaced, such flagrant violation of democracy would assuredly cause a greater backlash than the infamous extradition bill. Knowing what the reality ahead of us could be, we have to combine our election and international strategies to oppose the placement of a 35+ LegCo with an “Emergency Legislative Council 2.0”, to advance an international “Laam-chaau” to Hong Kong’s status as “separate customs territory”. Only then will we stand a chance to resist the regime and to realise the five demands.
Adjusting our mindset: Overcoming the “constitutional crisis” to reach a resolution
Upon the realization of the “35+” LegCo, it is expected that the CCP will launch a devastating counterattack. The Pan-Dems should not expect LegCo to run normally; neither can the lawmakers realise their governing blueprints they have for Hong Kong. Rather, candidates will be able to compete against one another with visions of a liberated Hong Kong through popular vote. Bringing this point up has nothing to do with undermining the common goal of reaching a majority in LegCo, but rather channels the battle of LegCo to positive use upon the rule of law’s death and a “constitutional crisis” ahead. Knowing that Hongkongers have nothing to fall back on, all Pan-Dems should not miss the only way to the realization of “35+”.
Thus, be they partisans, nonpartisans, incumbent politicians, amateur politicians, or the civil society as a whole – if we stay in the political discourse of 2016 and continue to perpetuate old stereotypes, that is to deal with the divisions on the pan-democratic camp by favouring the most “local” faction; to consider only resource allocation and self-aggrandizement as the purpose of a LegCo campaign; to ignore how potential lawmakers are fitted to what specific roles; to turn a blind eye to the journey of resistance since last summer (extending indefinitely into the future)—They would lead as astray and cost us lose a precious opportunity for change by winning a 35+ majority.
The extent to which the pan-democrats can stay united in light of the political atmosphere since last summer is another problem that our side must to address. Before the watershed moment of 12th June 2019, many democratic delegates were trapped in the mentality of needing to “preserve people’s livelihood”, “be content of what we have accomplished”, and other strategies that favours stability. As the government refuses to heed to the five demands, whether the democrats, especially those in the functional constituencies, have the political will to go all-in is the real difficult question that confronts us in the upcoming LegCo election.
All in all, if “35+” cannot be realised, it is unsurprising to see LegCo being more heavily suppressed in the next 4 years; even if "35+" is achieved, it is questionable whether the pan-democrats are able to weather multiple attacks, verbal or physical, from the regime (judging from its power in the last four years) and utilise the international Laam-chaau strategy against the displacement of LegCo. Adhering to the motto of “we fight on, each in his own way”, I can only hope that Hongkongers in elections, street confrontations and international front can reconcile with each other, so that we may collectively compel the government to yield to our demands in the next six months. It is only by reaching a resolution before a real constitutional crisis that we can combat the institutional violence of the regime and not be devoured by it.
https://hkcolumn.blogspot.com/2020/04/joshua-wong-after-winning-majority-in.html?fbclid=IwAR216gf53pG_j9JOpDfr2GItvjLfrFSekKTPzoEs3-s9KBqvPEwz865P8vw
同時也有10000部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過2,910的網紅コバにゃんチャンネル,也在其Youtube影片中提到,...
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#魯曼譯歌
歌名 : 山丘
原唱 : 李宗盛
本影片utube連結: https://youtu.be/ghAteKde-pM
歡迎訂閱我們的utube頻道喔
重要單字片語:
inspiration n. 靈感 converge v. 匯集 almighty adj. 強大的
beV aware of 知道 retrospect v. 回顧; 憶往innocently adv. 無辜地
overestimate v. 估計 capability n. 能力 fatigue n. 疲勞
mount v. 登上 in spite of 儘管 nag v. 嘮叨
melancholy n. 憂傷 witness v. 見證 eternity n. 永恆
retrieve v. 收回 affection n. 關愛 intend to v. 意圖
spoil v. 毀壞 mature adj. 成熟的 seduction n. 誘惑
fate n. 命運 overestimate v. 高估 be ashamed of 羞恥於…
exert v. 使出
譯文解析
越過山丘 => mount the hill
(登上山丘)
我倆各自一端 => we can stand with the river between us
(中間隔著河站著)
雖然已白了頭 => in spite of the gray hair
( 中文的因年老而生的白髮,英文要講灰髮喔)
唏噓 => sighed out
時不我予的 => ~~ of missing the boat
(英文的”錯失機會”就是 miss the boat喔! )
不自量力地 ~overestimate one’s capability and ….
( 高估某人的能力而…)
譯文全文及中文歌詞
想說卻還沒說的 還很多 There is still much which I I want to say but not yet.
攢著是因為想寫成歌 I save them because I want to write songs.
讓人輕輕地唱著 淡淡地記著 Let people sing softly and keep in mind casually.
就算終於忘了 也值了Even though being forgot, they have proven their worth.
說不定我一生涓滴意念 僥倖匯成河Maybe my trickling inspiration can converge into a river,
然後我倆各自一端 and we can stand with the river between us
望著大河彎彎 終於敢放膽 facing the almighty curvy river and then finally we exert enough courage
嘻皮笑臉 面對 人生的難 to smile at all the hard time in life.
也許我們從未成熟 Maybe we have never been mature.
還沒能曉得 就快要老了 We are gonna get senior-aged before we are aware of it.
儘管心裡活著的還是那個年輕人 even though there are still young men inside us.
因為不安而頻頻回首 Lacking the sense of safety, we retrospect again and again
無知地索求 羞恥於求救 desiring innocently and being ashamed of asking for help.
不知疲倦地翻越 每一個山丘 We mount all the hill unaware of fatigue.
越過山丘 雖然已白了頭 We mount the hill in spite of the gray hair.
喋喋不休 時不我予的哀愁 We keep nagging about the melancholy of missing the boat.
還未如願見著不朽 Before witnessing the eternity as we wish,
就把自己先搞丟 we ourselves get lost.
越過山丘 才發現無人等候 Mounting the hill, we find no one waiting.
喋喋不休 再也喚不回溫柔 No matter how hard we talk, we can never retrieve affection.
為何記不得上一次是誰給的擁抱 Why can’t I remember who gave me the last hug?
在什麼時候 And when was I given?
我沒有刻意隱藏 也無意讓你感傷 I don’t intend to hide it or make you sad.
多少次我們無醉不歡 How many times can’t we have fun without getting drunk?
咒罵人生太短 唏噓相見恨晚 We curse at our short lives. We sighed out why we met so late.
讓女人把妝哭花了 也不管 We are careless when women spoil their makeup with their tears.
遺憾我們從未成熟 It’s a pity that we have never been mature.
還沒能曉得 就已經老了 We have already been before we were aware of it.
盡力卻仍不明白 No matter how hard we try,
身邊的年輕人 we couldn’t understand the young people around us.
給自己隨便找個理由 We casually pick up a reason.
向情愛的挑逗 命運的左右 With seduction and fate
不自量力地還手 直至死方休 we overestimate our capability and fight back till we die.
越過山丘 雖然已白了頭 We mount the hill in spite of the gray hair.
喋喋不休 時不我予的哀愁 We keep nagging about the melancholy of missing the boat.
還未如願見著不朽 Before witnessing the eternity as we wish,
就把自己先搞丟 we ourselves get lost.
越過山丘 才發現無人等候 Mounting the hill, we find no one waiting.
喋喋不休 再也喚不回了溫柔 No matter how hard we talk, we can never retrieve affection.
為何記不得上一次是誰給的擁抱 Why can’t I remember by whom I was last time given a hug
在什麼時候 And when?
越過山丘 雖然已白了頭 We mount the hill in spite of the gray hair.
喋喋不休 時不我予的哀愁 We keep nagging about the melancholy of missing the boat.
還未如願見著不朽 Before witnessing the eternity as we wish,
就把自己先搞丟 we ourselves got lost.
越過山丘 才發現無人等候 Mounting the hill, we find no one waiting.
喋喋不休 再也喚不回了溫柔 No matter how hard we talk, we can never retrieve affection.
為何記不得上一次是誰給的擁抱 Why can’t I remember by whom I was last time given a hug?
在什麼時候 And when?
喋喋不休 時不我予的哀愁 We keep nagging about the melancholy of missing the boat.
向情愛的挑逗 命運的左右 With seduction and fate
不自量力地還手 直至死方休 we overestimate our capability and fight back till we die.
為何記不得上一次是誰給的擁抱 Why can’t I remember by whom I was last time given a hug?
在什麼時候 And when ?
overestimate中文 在 US Taiwan Watch: 美國台灣觀測站 Facebook 的最讚貼文
柯文哲在今日刊出的彭博(Bloomberg)訪問上說:
「台灣不過是架上的商品,我們必須對自己有清楚的認識」
Taiwan is just a product on a shelf. We have to have a very clear understanding of ourselves.
「台灣不應該高估美國守護台灣阻止中國攻擊的意願」
Taiwan shouldn’t overestimate the U.S.’s willingness to defend the island from an attack by its much bigger neighbor.
「台灣問題只是美中之爭的一部分」
The Taiwan issue is just a part of the tensions between the U.S. and China
---
疑美論到現在還是台灣社會主流的聲音,儘管從1949年以來台灣就是依靠美國的經濟與軍事援助,才能夠發展到現在,而且在過去一次又一次地關鍵時刻,美國都出手幫忙,但還是有人覺得「美國早晚會把台灣賣掉」。
如果說美國真的要賣台好了,一定是利大於弊才會賣。那請問,要有多大的利益才能說服美國拱手把西太平洋戰略前線給中國拿去?
儘管台媒喜歡強調川普的商人背景,形塑他捉摸不定的性格。然而,一方面,他的行事仍然不可能脫離黨的方針與國會的制衡:例如之前他說要想辦法救中興,直接立刻被自家共和黨打臉,而且連一向對中溫和的民主黨跟著跳上車喊打,結果就是國會立刻通過修正案來擋對中興施救;另一方面,疑美論者完全忽視了地緣政治是多麼地重要。
過去台海發生過幾次危機,如果美國要賣台灣,老早就有機會可以賣。
* 八二三炮戰(1958)
國際上通常稱作第一次台海危機。儘管當時美國並不同意蔣介石防衛金馬的政策,因為美國認為守住金馬的成本太高,且對保衛台灣沒有太大幫助,最終卻還是送來大砲和飛彈協防。
* 九六飛彈危機(1996)
即便是提出「三不政策」、態度對中國較為友善的柯林頓,在1996年中國對台海試射飛彈企圖干預首次總統大選,也派遣第七艦隊航母戰鬥群嚇阻中國。
當初中國通過《反分裂國家法》時,同一年美國國會立刻通過了6個譴責案。小編追縱了那麼多台灣相關法案,從未看過針對單一議題,幾個月內連續提那麼多案的。
去年底(2017),川普政府在他發布的《國家安全戰略報吿》中,除了破天荒稱中國為「競爭者」,更是白紙黑字地寫著「美國會信守《台灣關係法》的承諾持續加強與台灣的關係,且滿足台灣防禦需求以抵禦威脅」。
如果美國沒有在1958年幫忙守住台灣,1959年出生的柯文哲市長,現在也不用擔心一直被人用「一家親」攻擊,因為早就已經是一家人了。
沒有人喜歡自己被當棋子,也當然沒有人喜歡被當籌碼。但大家要知道的是,在中美關係升級成全面性的競爭關係的同時,台灣是在舞台的正中央那個行為者,沒有什麼保持中立或者不要選邊站的空間。
兩個老爸都在看,看你要選哪一邊。
其實也不難選,
看是要跟中國一起,然後之後被美國聯合其集團制裁,
還是要跟美國一起,然後之後被中國制裁。
好笑的是,我們現在其實早就已經在被中國制裁了不是嗎?
再來看看對岸發生的事。香港回歸中國之後,中國保證50年不變,結果不過十來年就已經全面緊縮香港的政治與經濟權利,還說中英協議只是普通文件不算數。在新疆,中共已建立起大規模集中營,讓新疆穆斯林們改變自己的信仰、放棄自己的語言文化與習慣,臣服於「黨」的「恩惠」。
一邊是台灣早已被認定所在的自由民主陣營,一邊是尋求中華民族復興的偉大共產黨領導的獨裁陣營。
這個選擇題很難嗎?
#不是說好了兩岸關係是總統級的問題所以不回答
#蔡英文國慶文告中強調維持現狀不惹中美兩邊森氣的苦心
#就這樣被阿伯在外媒前破功
#大家想想看現狀下台灣是在哪一邊啦
#而且還不忘詆毀一下台灣的民主法治
#如果自認或自甘為是棋子那是不是代表不需要積極做什麼事情因為我只是任人擺佈的棋子啊
▍新聞連結:
彭博報導原文:https://bloom.bg/2q0MmjO
中央社的中文報導及彭博中文版報導截圖:https://bit.ly/2S1Qpc5
▍延伸閱讀:楊光舜針對疑美派之回應
美國會賣掉台灣嗎
http://bit.ly/2OxPfHb
告別「疑美論」-回應杜心武《美國是否棄台的關鍵》
http://bit.ly/2R25kSC
守護台灣,就是美國的國家利益
http://bit.ly/2RYcMzf