Asian-Americans Are Being Attacked. Why Are Hate Crime Charges So Rare?
On a cold evening last month, a Chinese man was walking home near Manhattan’s Chinatown neighborhood when a stranger suddenly ran up behind him and plunged ( ) a knife into his back.
For many Asian-Americans, the stabbing ( ) was horrifying, but not surprising. It was widely seen as just the latest example of racially targeted violence against Asians during the pandemic.
But the perpetrator ( ), a 23-year-old man from Yemen, had not said a word to the victim before the attack, investigators ( ) said. Prosecutors ( ) determined they lacked enough evidence to prove a racist ( ) motive ( ). The attacker was charged with attempted murder, but not as a hate crime ( ).
The announcement outraged ( ) Asian-American leaders in New York City. Many of them protested ( ) outside the Manhattan district attorney’s office, demanding that the stabbing be prosecuted as a hate crime. They were tired of what they saw as racist assaults being overlooked ( ) by the authorities ( ).
The rally ( ) reflected the tortured ( ) public conversation over how to confront ( ) a rise in reports of violence against Asian-Americans, who have felt increasingly vulnerable ( ) with each new attack. Many incidents have either not led to arrests or have not been charged as hate crimes, making it difficult to capture with reliable data the extent to which Asian-Americans are being targeted.
That frustration erupted on a national scale ( ) this week after Robert Aaron Long, a white man, was charged with fatally shooting eight people, including six women of Asian descent ( ), at spas in the Atlanta area on Tuesday night.
Other incidents that clearly seemed racially motivated have not resulted in arrests. The police are still searching for a man who called an Asian-American mother the “Chinese virus” and spat ( ) at her child in Queens last week.
In New York State, to charge ( ) such attacks as hate crimes, prosecutors would need to show that the victims were targeted because of their race.
But proving a racist motive can be particularly difficult with attacks against Asians, experts say. There is no widely recognized symbol of anti-Asian hate comparable to a noose ( ) or a swastika ( ). Historically, many Asian crime victims around the country were small-business owners who were robbed, complicating ( ) the question of motive.
Under New York State law, certain offenses can be upgraded to hate crimes, increasing the potential prison sentence ( ). As evidence, prosecutors often point to hateful verbal statements or social media posts by the defendant ( ).
In the past month alone, several assaults ( ) on Asian victims have been reported to the police, including an attack on an older woman who was pushed outside a bakery in Queens. None of the incidents has been charged as a hate crime.
In fact, the only person who has been prosecuted for an anti-Asian hate crime in New York City this year is Taiwanese. He was accused of writing anti-Chinese graffiti outside several businesses in Queens.
Wayne Ho, president of the Chinese-American Planning Council, a social services agency, said many of his Asian colleagues were verbally harassed ( ) during the pandemic but chose not to alert law enforcement because they worried the perpetrators, who were often people of color, could be mistreated ( ) by the police.
“I asked myself, do I want this person in jail?” said Alice Wong, one of Mr. Ho’s colleagues. “Just because you put someone in jail doesn’t make them not hate anyone anymore.”
Recognizing ( ) this challenge, some law enforcement officials have called for people who commit hate crimes to attend antiracism classes as an alternative ( ) to prison.
為何針對亞裔的暴力襲擊難以被控仇恨犯罪?
上月一個寒冷的晚上,一名華裔男子在曼哈頓中國城社區附近步行回家時,一個陌生人突然跑到他身後,把刀刺進他的後背。
對許多亞裔美國人來說,這起事件令人驚恐,但並不意外。人們普遍認為,這只是在疫情期間針對亞裔的種族暴力的最新例子。
但調查人員表示,行兇者是一名23歲的葉門男子,他在襲擊前沒有對受害者說過一句話。檢察官認為缺乏足夠的證據來證明種族主義動機。襲擊者被指控謀殺未遂,而不是出於仇恨犯罪。
這一聲明激怒了紐約市的亞裔美國人領袖。他們中的許多人在曼哈頓地區檢察官辦公室外抗議,要求以仇恨犯罪的罪名起訴。他們厭倦了他們眼中的種族主義攻擊被當局忽視。
這次集會反映了對於如何應對暴力侵害亞裔美國人的報導增多,公眾開始了痛苦的討論。每一次新的襲擊都讓亞裔美國人感到越來越脆弱。許多事件要不是沒有逮捕任何人,就是沒有被指控為仇恨犯罪,因此很難用可靠的數據來了解亞裔美國人在多大程度上成為攻擊目標。
在白人男子羅伯特•亞倫•朗(Robert Aaron Long)被控週二晚在亞特蘭大地區的水療中心開槍打死八人(其中包括六名亞裔女性)後,這種不滿情緒本週在全國範圍內爆發。
其他明顯帶有種族動機的事件並沒有導致逮捕。目前警方仍在搜尋一名男子,此人上週在皇后區稱一名亞裔美國母親為「中國病毒」,並向她的孩子吐口水。
在紐約州,要指控此類襲擊為仇恨犯罪,檢察官需要證明受害者是因其種族而成為攻擊目標。
但專家表示,在針對亞裔的攻擊中,證明種族主義動機可能特別困難。沒有一種被廣泛認可的反亞裔仇恨象徵可以對應套索或納粹符號。歷史上,全國各地的許多亞裔犯罪受害者都是被搶劫的小商店業者,這使得動機問題變得更加複雜。
根據紐約州的法律,某些犯罪行為可以升級為仇恨犯罪,從而增加潛在的監禁刑期。作為證據,檢察官經常指出被告充滿仇恨的口頭聲明或社群媒體發文。
僅在過去的一個月中,警方就接到了數起針對亞裔受害者的襲擊報告,其中包括在皇后區一名老年女性被推出一家麵包店。沒有任何事件被指控為仇恨犯罪。
實際上,紐約市今年因反亞裔仇恨罪被起訴的唯一一人是台灣人。他被指控在皇后區的幾家商店外塗鴉反華內容。
社會服務機構華裔美國人規劃委員會(Chinese-American Planning Council)主席韋恩•何(Wayne Ho)表示,他的許多亞裔同事在疫情大流行期間受到了口頭騷擾,但他們選擇不向執法部門報告,因為他們擔心騷擾者(通常是有色人種)可能會受到警方的虐待。
「我問自己,我想讓這個人進監獄嗎?」韋恩•何的同事愛麗絲•黃(Alice Wong)說。「把一個人關進監獄並不會讓他們不再憎恨任何人。」
認識到這一挑戰,一些執法官員呼籲犯下仇恨罪行的人參加反種族歧視課程,以替代坐牢。
#高雄人 #學習英文 #多益達人林立英文
#高中英文 #成人英文
#多益家教班 #商用英文
#國立大學英文學系講師
同時也有2部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過2萬的網紅賓狗單字Bingo Bilingual,也在其Youtube影片中提到,00:00:11 liaison 聯絡 00:01:00 air defense 空防 00:01:50 misconduct 濫用職權;不當行為 00:03:07 send a message 傳達理念 00:04:28 emulate 模擬;效仿 00:05:21 簡單複習 【大綱】 liai...
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police office英文 在 小胖子的陽春麵 Facebook 的精選貼文
現在才有空坐下來談談今天爆出的中共與我國在斐濟爆發外交人員互毆事件
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重要的事先說, 我當然贊成維護中華民國的尊嚴
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但我也提醒 : 這裡面的水還很深, 目前有很多可能
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簡單描述我看到的 :
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1. 中華民國國慶海外慶祝是每年都辦, 中共也每年都會蒐證;
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2. 今年似乎是第一次傳出要進入會場拍照, 為何今年特別鬧出事情? 進醫院的驗傷報告可信嗎? (想想當初拔管自掐哥)
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3. 想想今年國慶, 蔡英文才說著要放軟, 一改年初選舉的強硬, 結果10月8日冒出事情 現在10/19才說? 是過往都有類似衝突事件, 還是今年特別? 根據斐濟新聞, 是台灣方面先阻止中共蒐證 (https://www.fijivillage.com/news/Police-investigate-a-complaint-of-staff-of-the-Chinese-Embassy-allegedly-assaulted-by-a-Taipei-Trade-Office-employee-fx854r)
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4. 想想一次世界大戰就是奧地利王儲被暗殺, 之後引發外交衝突, 換言之, 外交衝突是可以引發戰爭的, 這次這樣搞 可能還不夠大到引戰, 卻可以塑造中共的惡霸形象, 對誰有利? 不禁望向深陷選戰中的川普, 已經到不放震撼彈就打不贏選戰的川普, 會不會故意扯一場1995閏八月以來最嚴重台海威脅來挽救他自己的選情?
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5. 曾經專人專機小豬送暖給希拉蕊的蔡英文現在應該是死抱著川普大腿, 吸住不放, 連美豬睪丸都可以吃, #蔡英文會不會拿全台灣百姓來賭川普勝選進而台灣與美國加深外交關係?
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斐濟新聞我放在下面
https://www.fijivillage.com/news/Police-investigate-a-complaint-of-staff-of-the-Chinese-Embassy-allegedly-assaulted-by-a-Taipei-Trade-Office-employee-fx854r
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It is alleged that the Taipei Trade Office worker had assaulted the Chinese Embassy staff on October 8th 2020 at the Grand Pacific Hotel in Suva during the 109th National Day of the Republic of China (Taiwan). Police say the Chinese Embassy staff has claimed that he was allegedly assaulted while trying to enter the venue of the event.
Naisoro says there is no report of the Taipei Trade Office employee getting assaulted.
She says the number of people involved will be determined in the investigation as the lodged report deals with the alleged assault by the Taipei Trade Office worker.
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據稱,台北貿易辦事處的一名工作人員於2020年10月8日在中華民國(台灣)第109個國慶日在蘇瓦的太平洋大飯店毆打了中國大使館工作人員。警方說,中國大使館工作人員聲稱,他在試圖進入活動地點時遭到毆打。
內索羅說,沒有報導台北貿易辦公室的員工遭到毆打。
她說,涉及的人數將在調查中確定,因為提交的報告涉及的是台北貿易辦事處工作人員的所謂襲擊。
police office英文 在 堅離地城:沈旭暉國際生活台 Simon's Glos World Facebook 的精選貼文
【#TheDiplomat: 沈旭暉隨緣家書英文版🇭🇰】很久沒有向國際關係評論網 The Diplomat 供稿,但國際線十分重要,不應放棄。這次他們希望分享23條、國安法、反恐法風雨欲來的「新香港」前瞻,願國際社會能多了解快將出現的危機:
While the world is preoccupied with a fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing has been tightening its political grip on all aspects of Hong Kong’s civil society. Rumor has it that Beijing will push through legislating national security laws under Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law by unconventional means, such as massively disqualifying pro-democratic legislators or even directly applying a national law, widely argued as a major step to destroy the rights and freedom of Hong Kongers, and bring Chinese authoritarianism to Hong Kong.
After the 2019 protests, the administration of Carrie Lam, who theoretically is still leading the special administrative region of China, has little political capital at stake, with its legitimacy reaching rock bottom. The pro-government camp has dwindling prospects for the city’s upcoming Legislative Council election. The government‘s ”nothing to lose“ mentality is apparent from its recent blatant reinterpretation of the Basic Law’s Article 22 (another article that limits the influence of China’s offices in Hong Kong’s internal affairs). The debate is nothing new, but the pressure this time is quite different.
This article highlights the different strategies Beijing could adopt to enact Article 23 insidiously or under disguise to avoid backlash from the international community, while continuing to reap benefits from the city’s globally recognized special status. This seems to be part of Beijing’s brinkmanship to bring Hong Kong protesters and their supporters to their knees and move the city closer to authoritarianism. To counter these moves, Hong Kongers must define the boundaries beyond which Hong Kong falls into authoritarian rule and make a case as to why the city’s downfall is detrimental to the international community‘s interest.
The Long-Term Controversy Over National Security Laws
Back in 2003, the implementation of Article 23 was thwarted by the moderate pro-establishment politician James Tien. In face of overwhelming public disapproval of the law, he withdrew support and votes from his Liberal Party. However, 17 years later, it is hard to imagine Beijing following the old legislative playbook: start with a public consultation, followed by public discourse and political debate, and end with the majority rule. This playbook only works in peaceful societies ruled by a trustworthy government with integrity.
The aftermath of 2003, as well as the 2019 protests, should have taught Beijing and the Hong Kong government a lesson: pushing through national security legislation in a flawed parliament controlled by the minority pro-government camp would inevitably set off another full city-scale protest — and undoubtedly more fierce and focused this time. Given the current government’s numerous displays of dishonesty, it is conceivable that they will embark on a less-traveled path to implement Article 23.
Strategy One: “Anti-Terrorism”
In principle, one possible strategy could be to directly enact Chinese national law across Hong Kong, which can be achieved by declaring a state of emergency in the city. However, this is risky business as it would tarnish the integrity of “one country two systems” and subsequently Hong Kong’s international standing. Beijing, a risk-averse regime, is also unwilling to see Hong Kong’s status as a middleman for laundering money disappear into thin air.
Instead, Beijing could be concocting a narrative that would see Chinese national law applied to Hong Kong while not damaging Hong Kong’s international standing and Beijing’s own interests. The key word in this script is “anti-terrorism.” As early as 2014, pro-Beijing scholars have been claiming the emergence of “local terrorist ideology” on Hong Kong soil. Since the anti-extradition bill protests last year, government rhetoric frequently described the protests, which caused no deaths at all in the entire year, with phrases like “inclination to terrorist ideology.” That was a signal to the world that Hong Kong’s internal conflicts had ballooned into a national security issue. This gives the government the legitimacy to justify the implementation of Chinese national laws across the highly autonomous region to counter terrorism. The Chinese government knows that if it can persuade the world that terrorism exists in Hong Kong, and that it is as severe as the terror threat facing many other nations today, the international community will be less critical of Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong. Enacting Chinese laws directly is a convenient path that will save Beijing from having to tackle Hong Kong’s internal conflicts, basically turning the Hong Kong issue into a nonissue.
Strategy Two: Stacking the Legislature by Disqualifying Candidates
An even bolder strategy was probably foretold by a recent incident where the Hong Kong government and Beijing’s agencies for Hong Kong affairs (HKMAO and the Liaison Office) jointly criticized lawmaker Dennis Kwok for filibustering, framing it as “misconduct in public office” and “violating his oath.” It is incomprehensible to claim that filibustering goes against a lawmaker’s main duty; rather, it is common understanding that legislative work includes debating the law and representing public opinion against unreasonable laws. In a parliament controlled by the minority, pro-democratic members representing the majority of Hong Kongers are forced to express their objections using means like filibustering. Wouldn’t a lack of different political opinions turn the legislative branch into a rubber-stamp institution?
The above allegation has set a dangerous precedent for twisting the logic behind a certain provision in the Basic Law to target opposing lawmakers. In other words, to fulfill Beijing’s interpretation of the principal requirement for holding public office in Hong Kong, one could be required to take a meticulously legalistic approach to uphold the Basic Law down to its every single wording. A public official, by this new definition, not only needs to support “one country, two systems” or object Hong Kong independence, but also must abide by every single provision in the Basic Law. Worst of all, based on the previous cases, whether an official’s words or actions oversteps a provision is up to Beijing’s interpretation of his/her “intent.”
If this approach is applied, in the next election, there might be additional official questions for screening candidates like the following: “The Basic Law states that the enactment of Article 23 is a constitutional duty. Failing to support Article 23 legislation violates the Basic Law. Do you support it?” This question would suffice to disqualify even moderate or even pro-establishment candidates like James Tien. Even if any pro-democratic candidates were elected, once Article 23 re-enters the legislative process, they could risk ouster by raising objections.
Despite the absurdity of this tactic, the Chinese regime may just be tempted enough if such a strategy could resolve two of China’s current nuisances — voices of dissent in the Legislative Council and the previous failure to implement Article 23.
Strategy Three: The “Boiling Frog Effect”
Article 23 is not yet implemented, but the dystopian world that the protesters pictured in 2003 is already becoming reality. Regular citizens have been persecuted for “sedition” for sharing their views on social media or participating in legal protests; workers face retaliation for taking part in strikes; corporations are pressured to publicly side with the government’s stance; employees who have the “wrong” political views are fired; schools have been closely monitored for teaching material; protest-supporting fundraisers were framed for money laundering; a retweet or like may lead to persecution, under a colonial-era law. Only now have Hong Kongers woken up to their new reality — although the Basic Law technically protects citizens’ rights to speak, rally, march, demonstrate, and go on strike, the government could enfeeble civil rights by bending antiquated laws and legal provisions. The frequent abuse of law enforcement power on a small scale, such as improper arrests and police violence, is desensitizing the public and the international community. In a few years, Hong Kong will become unrecognizable. This is indeed a clever play on Beijing’s part to slowly strip away Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom, without causing much international attention.
Counter-Strategies Against Beijing’s Brinkmanship
Beijing’s overarching goal is to hollow out Hong Kong but, at the same time, avoid major backlash from the international community, which could spell the end of the privileged global status of Hong Kong not granted to other Chinese cities. Beijing also aims at preventing single incidents that could cascade down into mass protests as seen in 2003, 2014, and 2019; and eliminating any resistance forces from within Hong Kong’s legislature. The tactics outlined above are typical in a game of brinkmanship.
In response, Hong Kongers in Hong Kong and on the so-called “international frontline” must know their strengths and bargaining chips on this negotiating table with Beijing.
Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong is a city with transparency and free flow of information. Hong Kongers need to make a case to the world that the protests are not acts of terrorism. Some suggestions include comparing the Hong Kong protests to similar struggles in 20 or so other counties in the world at the present time, none of which were classified as terrorism; collecting a large amount of concrete evidence of the disproportionate use of force by the Hong Kong police; and showing how enacting Chinese national laws in Hong Kong will end the city’s autonomy and spell disaster for international community‘s interests.
The Legislative Council is the institution that can counteract Beijing’s “boiling frog” strategy and to keep Hong Kongers’ hope alive in the system. Those who plan to run for legislative office must be prepared to be disqualified from running. If only individuals are banned, there need to be alternative candidates as back-up plans. However, if and when the disqualification process is applied broadly to entire camps of candidates (for example, all who object to Article 23), the pro-democracy camp must make a strong case to the Hong Kong and global public that this is the endgame for Hong Kong democracy. Then the incumbent popularly elected legislators will hold the internationally recognized mandate from the public and serve as the last resistance.
These recommendations delineates how the slogan “if we burn, you burn with us,” often seen in the protests, may play out in the game of international relations. If the national security laws are “passed” by a legislature that is jury-rigged in this manner, or if related national laws are directly implemented in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers should signal clearly to the world that it goes way beyond the promised “one country, two systems.” Crossing this red line by Beijing should be seen by the world as a blunt violation of its promised autonomy to Hong Kongers. At that time, if the international community led by the United States and the United Kingdom decided to revoke the “non-sovereignty entity” status of Hong Kong and regard the SAR as an ordinary Chinese city, it shouldn’t come as a surprise.
Dr. Simon Shen is the Founding Chairman of GLOs (Glocal Learning Offices), an international relations start-up company. He also serves as an adjunct associate professor in the University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and associate director of the Master of Global Political Economy Programme of the CUHK. The author acknowledges Jean Lin, Coco Ho, Chris Wong, Michelle King, and Alex Yap for their assistance in this piece.
▶️ 高度自治 vs 全面管治
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwt8wZl8jHQ
police office英文 在 賓狗單字Bingo Bilingual Youtube 的最佳貼文
00:00:11 liaison 聯絡
00:01:00 air defense 空防
00:01:50 misconduct 濫用職權;不當行為
00:03:07 send a message 傳達理念
00:04:28 emulate 模擬;效仿
00:05:21 簡單複習
【大綱】
liaison 聯絡(工作或合作上的聯絡)
North Korea has blown up an inter-korean liaison office.
北韓炸掉南北韓的聯絡辦公室
北韓在氣什麼呢?南韓一直送傳單過去,說北韓壞話
(更多細節在 EP35)
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/06/16/asia/north-korea-explosion-intl-hnk/index.html
air defence 空防
Japan suspended plans to deploy two U.S.-made air defence radar stations.
日本原本要升級空防系統,就是對抗空襲的裝備啦。但人生就跟手遊一樣,裝備要升級,需要課金,but,武漢肺炎把經濟拉垮,日本就放棄升級裝備了。這次疫情真的是影響到各個層面,連軍事也被拖下水了。
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-defence-aegis-idUSKBN23M10V
misconduct 濫用職權;不當行為
The executive order would create a database to track police misconduct.
資料庫 misconduct
鼓勵警察與心理專業人員合作:處理遊民、心理疾病跟成癮案例
覺得有點空泛,希望後續會有具體細節
行政命令(有法律效力,但可以司法審查推翻)
https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/donald-trump/trump-says-he-will-sign-executive-order-policing-tuesday-n1231113
send a message 傳達理念
It is hoped that the rescue of counter-protester sends a message.
有個人,上一秒在辱罵你,下一秒受傷了,你會救他嗎?
美國警察亂殺黑人,在倫敦也引起抗議,希望不要再歧視黑人或任何種族。上週六,有個白人在抗議現場受傷了。結果一位黑人壯漢把這個白人傷患扛在肩上,護送他到警察身邊。
這個白人,歧視黑人
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/jun/15/blm-band-of-brothers-hope-rescue-of-counter-protester-sends-message
emulate 模擬;效仿
This game simply emulates the jump rope experience.
任天堂 Switch 推出跳繩遊戲,你只要拿著 Switch 的握把(Joy-Con),模擬跳繩的動作,就可以健身練肌肉了喔~ 而且這款遊戲,免費!當然,你還是要先弄到手一台 Switch 啦...
https://www.engadget.com/jump-rope-challenge-switch-fitness-game-050605214.html
恭喜你!今天學了 5 個新單字,還聽了 5 則國際大事!你喜歡這樣聽新聞、學英文嗎?希望你可以訂閱我們的 podcast,然後為我們留 5 顆星的評價。謝謝收聽,下次通勤見 ❤️
police office英文 在 風傳媒 The Storm Media Youtube 的最佳解答
On Taiwan Hashtag hosted by Ross Feingold, we discuss the release from
prison in Hong Kong of Chan Tong-kai 陳同佳, wanted in Taiwan for the
murder of Poon Hui-wing 潘曉穎. The now withdrawn Extradition Bill in Hong
Kong was originally proposed by the Hong Kong government to extradite
Chan to Taiwan in the absence of a bilateral extradition agreement.
Despite Chan’s apparent willingness to return to Taiwan, Hong Kong’s
government has rejected the conditions demanded by Taiwan’s government
which include the exchange of Chan’s testimony and other evidence that
Hong Kong police and prosecutors may have obtained from Chan. Taiwan has
also required that Chan and Reverend Peter Koon Ho-ming, who is willing
to accompany Chan to Taiwan, present themselves at Taiwan’s
representative office in Hong Kong for a visa interview, to confirm
Chan’s identity and due to Koon’s status as a Chinese People’s Political
Consultative Conference representative. Taiwan government statements
continue to evolve on whether Hong Kong has jurisdiction over Chan for
the murder charge. Unnecessary conditions by Taiwan? Unnecessary
politicization of the matter? Unnecessary delay of justice? Watch our
show for latest analysis.
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police office英文 在 一對一英文推薦-ebs英文顧問團隊- 【 學習】 Officer & Official ... 的推薦與評價
【 學習】 Officer & Official 有什麼不同呢? . ***Officer: ( 軍隊裡的) 長官, ( 海關) 官員,警員( 美式英文) The customs officer checked my suitcase at the ... ... <看更多>