✨本周AIT孫曉雅處長的行程一樣緊湊而充實,繼續馬不停蹄拜會台灣各部會及機關首長,一起來看看雙邊討論了什麼議題:
✅8月30日,孫處長與 #台北市 市長柯文哲 會面,了解台北市如何透過姊妹市夥伴關係進行雙邊合作,以及柯市長的優先政策。隨後,孫處長拜會 #科技部 部長吳政忠,雙方談及「美台科學及技術合作協定」、人工智慧的負責任發展以及台灣對「人才循環大聯盟」的支持。
✅8月31日,孫處長與 #新北市 市長侯友宜 會面,討論振興經濟議題以及新北市的疫情現況。當天稍後,孫處長與 #農委會 主委陳吉仲會面,就促進美台農業合作交換意見。接著,孫處長與 #文化部 部長李永得會面,雙方討論美台合作及文化交流,並見證了台灣文化部和學術交流基金會(台灣傅爾布萊特)的「傅爾布萊特—台灣文化部藝文專業人才獎助計畫」備忘錄簽署儀式,這項計畫旨在獎助台灣的藝文專業人才赴美學習交流。
✅9月1日,孫處長拜會 #財政部 部長蘇建榮,雙方談及「美台經濟繁榮夥伴對話」、供應鏈及共同關切的財政與關務交流等議題。隨後,孫處長與 #勞動部 部長許銘春會面,討論新冠疫情如何影響台灣的勞動政策。接著,孫處長與 #外貿協會 董事長黃志芳會面,並感謝外貿協會協助促進美台之間的商業機會。
✅9月2日,孫處長拜會 #台灣美國事務委員會 主委楊珍妮,並討論雙方關切的議題。孫處長本週的拜會行程也在這場會議之後畫下句點。
🤝在這些會面中,孫處長重申她對推動並深化美台夥伴關係的承諾,並強調美台共享的民主和經濟價值,以及美國對台灣恆久的承諾。
✅ This week, Director Oudkirk met with Taipei Mayor Ko Wen-je on August 30 to discuss bilateral cooperation through Taipei’s Sister City partnerships and Mayor Ko’s key priorities as well as with Minister of Science and Technology Wu Tsung-tsong to discuss implementation of the U.S.-Taiwan Science and Technology Agreement, the responsible development of artificial intelligence, and Taiwan’s support for the Talent Circulation Alliance initiative.
✅ On August 31, Director Oudkirk met with New Taipei City Mayor Hou Yu-ih to discuss economic recovery and COVID-19-related developments in New Taipei City and with Minister of Agriculture Chen Chi-chung to exchange views on advancing U.S.-Taiwan agricultural cooperation. Later in the day, Director Oudkirk and Minister of Culture Lee Yung-te discussed U.S.-Taiwan cooperation and cultural exchanges and witnessed the signing of an agreement between Taiwan’s Ministry of Culture and the Foundation for Scholarly Exchange (Fulbright Taiwan) to launch a new grant that will provide Taiwanese art professionals professional development opportunities in the United States.
✅ On September 1, Director Oudkirk and Minister of Finance Su Jain-rong met to talk about the Economic Prosperity Partnership Dialogue, supply chain issues, and fiscal and customs exchanges. She also met with Minister of Labor Hsu Ming-chun to discuss how COVID-19 has impacted Taiwan’s labor policy. Later that day, Director Oudkirk met with Taiwan External Trade Development Council (TAITRA) Chairman James Huang and thanked TAITRA for facilitating business opportunities between the United States and Taiwan.
✅ Director Oudkirk concluded this week’s courtesy calls by meeting Taiwan Council for U.S. Affairs (TCUSA) Chairperson Jen-ni Yang on September 2 to discuss issues of mutual interest.
🤝During these meetings, Director Oudkirk reiterated her commitment to advancing and deepening the U.S.-Taiwan partnership, stressed the common democratic and economic values that the United States and Taiwan share, and emphasized the United States’ enduring commitment to Taiwan.
同時也有1部Youtube影片,追蹤數超過0的網紅channelvtc,也在其Youtube影片中提到,Prepare Students to Become Future Engineering Specialists The Vocational Baccalaureate (VB) Programme (Engineering) covers practical modules in engi...
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the council for science and technology 在 Khairy Jamaluddin Facebook 的最佳解答
MAJLIS HIGH TECH NATION KETENGAHKAN TEKNOLOGI MASA HADAPAN
Semalam saya telah mempengerusikan Mesyuarat Majlis High-Tech Nation yang bertujuan merangka hala tuju teknologi sedia ada dan masa hadapan yang berpotensi untuk dibangunkan di Malaysia. Majlis ini juga akan melaporkan sebarang perkembangan secara terus kepada Majlis Sains Negara yang dipengerusikan oleh Perdana Menteri.
Program dan dasar yang akan dibentuk di bawah majlis ini adalah berpandukan kepada kerangka MySTIE 10-10 serta Dasar Sains, Teknologi dan Inovasi (DSTIN) 2021-2030 yang telah saya lancarkan minggu lalu. Sebanyak 30 bidang keutamaan telah dikenal pasti menerusi rangka kerja ini dan majlis ini akan merapatkan jurang yang wujud bagi memastikan ia dapat memberi kesan maksimum kepada setiap bidang keutamaan.
Majlis ini juga akan mengambil peranan secara proaktif dalam mengetengahkan teknologi masa hadapan yang akan melonjakkan kedudukan negara sebagai peneraju teknologi.
Saya juga telah memilih untuk mengutamakan beberapa program, hala tuju dan dasar agar sesuai dengan keperluan masa kini yang mendesak.
Antara cadangan yang telah dibentangkan semalam adalah berkenaan perubatan kepersisan (precision medicine) daripada Kementerian Kesihatan Malaysia (KKM). Perubatan kepersisan berasaskan teknologi data raya ini berupaya mendiagnos serta merancang perubatan yang berkualiti dan terjamin bagi seseorang pesakit.
Selain itu, Institut Penyelidikan Hidraulik Kebangsaan Malaysia (NAHRIM) juga telah membentangkan Hala Tuju Inovasi Air Negara yang akan menjamin keselamatan air. Menerusi hala tuju ini, sebanyak lima program telah dikenal pasti iaitu sungai yang bersih, rizab margin air, sistem air pintar, pengurangan risiko bencana dan pembiayaan air.
Kementerian Sains, Teknologi dan Inovasi (MOSTI) pula telah membentangkan 9 hala tuju yang sedang dibangunkan oleh agensi-agensi di bawah kementerian. Kesemua hala tuju yang akan dibentangkan pada pertengahan 2021 ini akan memacu kerajaan untuk merangka pelaburan serta memformulasi dasar terbaik dalam pembangunan teknologi-teknologi tersebut. Pelan itu antara lain akan merangkumi: blok rantai (blockchain); nanoteknologi; robotik; hidrogen; kecerdasan buatan (AI); litar bersepadu dan bahan termaju (advanced materials)
Akademi Sains Malaysia telah membentangkan cadangan untuk menginstitusikan sebuah badan pemecut pengkomersialan teknologi (Tech-Commercialisation Accelerator) bagi mengetuai dan mengkoordinasi usaha-usaha penyelidikan beradasarkan perniagaan serta ekonomi. Penyelidikan dan pembangunan (R&D) serta sistem penyampaian ini akan dibuat berasaskan permintaan serta keperluan pasaran untuk inovasi-inovasi penganggu (disruptive innovations). Saya akan mengumumkan lebih lanjut mengenai perkara ini sedikit masa lagi.
Institut Penyelidikan Keselamatan Jalan Raya Malaysia (MIROS) telah membentangkan kertas kerja ‘Teknologi Motosikal: Penyelesaian Kepada Dilema Kemajuan Ekonomi-Keselamatan’ dan menjelaskan bahawa 66 peratus daripada kematian di jalan raya melibatkan kemalangan motosikal. Kami berharap untuk memberi insentif dalam pembangunan, pengaplikasian dan penggunaan teknologi sedia ada serta akan datang bagi memperbaiki kebolehcapaian kesemua aspek keselamatan jalan raya. Bidang yang berpotensi untuk dibangunkan termasuklah teknologi pengujian serta verifikasi, teknologi penghindaran kemalangan, teknologi mengurangkan kecederaan (dalam kemalangan), teknologi pemaduan kembali sosial (social reintegration technology-merujuk kepada teknologi respons pintar awal dan pemulihan) serta teknologi pengurusan dan perancangan strategik.
Kementerian Alam Sekitar dan Air pula telah membentangkan Hala Tuju Inovasi Teknologi Hijau Kebangsaan yang mensasarkan penggunaan teknologi hijau menjelang 2030 bagi memastikan kemampanan alam sekitar negara. Inovasi-inovasi sektoral di bawah pelan ini termasuk perolehan hijau kerajaan, teknologi grid pintar, proses perindustrian hijau, pengawasan sungai melalui Internet Segala Benda (IoT), skim Waste to Energy (WTE) and wealth, pengaplikasian bangunan hijau dan pintar, kenderaan cekap tenaga dan kenderaan elektrik, pertanian bandar serta IoT pengawasan hutan.
Akhir sekali, dalam kita mengadaptasi perubahan tingkah laku akibat COVID-19, saya telah meminta MOSTI menyediakan satu kertas kerja mengenai Inisiatif Infrastruktur dan Ekonomi Sentuhan Rendah. Ini memerlukan anjakan paradigma bukan sahaja dalam cara kita berinteraksi sesama sendiri, malahan dengan dunia secara keseluruhan. Antaranya termasuklah penggosok lantai berautonomi, robot pembantu (membawa barangan) dan sistem pengurusan sisa pintar di pasar-pasar awam. MOSTI juga telah melancarkan penggunaan robot di hospital dengan kerjasama KKM serta memulakan modul robotik, dron serta AI di ladang-ladang bersama FELDA. Beberapa inisiatif ini akan direalisasikan di bawah Sandbox Teknologi dan Inovasi Nasional (NTIS).
Kebanyakan progam, hala tuju dan dasar sedia ada selama ini telah dimajukan secara berasingan atau bersendirian oleh pelbagai kementerian dan agensi. Majlis High Tech Nation adalah permulaan baharu kepada cara kita membangun dan mengaplikasi teknologi dalam negara bagi memastikan segalanya selaras dan koheren dengan keperluan nasional.
KHAIRY JAMALUDDIN
MENTERI SAINS, TEKNOLOGI DAN INOVASI
18 DECEMBER 2020
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HIGH-TECH NATION COUNCIL WILL CHAMPION UPCOMING TECHNOLOGIES
Yesterday, I chaired the first High-Tech Nation Council meeting, which aims to give strategic direction regarding existing and upcoming technology that has the potential to be developed in Malaysia. The High-Tech Nation Council will report directly to the National Science Council, which is chaired by the Prime Minister.
The programmes, roadmaps and policies under the High-Tech Nation Council are driven by the mySTIE 10-10 and National Science, Technology and Innovation Policy 2021-2030 that I launched last week. 30 niche areas were identified under this framework, and the High-Tech Nation Council will aim to fill in any gaps we have identified to make sure that there is maximum impact in these areas.
This Council will be proactive and champion upcoming technologies that we need to embark on as a nation to position us at the forefront of what is current and what is cutting-edge.
I have chosen to prioritise some of the programmes, roadmaps and policies in line with pressing national needs.
Some of the papers presented yesterday include the Ministry of Health’s paper on precision medicine, which takes a personalised, predictive, preventive and participatory approach to medicine. This will be layered together with big-data analytics to give personalised recommendations to each person.
National Hydraulic Research Institute of Malaysia (NAHRIM) presented on the National Water Innovation Roadmap, to guarantee national water security. This involves five programmes; Clean River, Reserve Margin, Smart Water, Disaster Risk Reduction, and Water Financing.
The Ministry of Science, Technology and Innovation presented nine roadmaps that are currently being developed under our agencies. All of these roadmaps will be unveiled by the middle of 2021. These roadmaps will guide our investments and policy direction in rolling out these technologies. They will cover: blockchain, nanotechnology, robotics, hydrogen, artificial intelligence, integrated circuits and advanced materials among others.
The Academy of Sciences presented on institutionalising a Tech-Commercialisation Accelerator, to spearhead and coordinate economic-oriented research in the form of demand-driven R&D and market-driven delivery systems for disruptive innovations. I will be announcing this in due course.
The Malaysian Institute of Road Safety Research (MIROS) also presented on Motorcycle Technology: Solving a Dilemma between Economic Development and Safety. 66% of the fatalities on the road involve motorcycles. We hope to incentive the development, application and deployment of existing and future technologies to improve accessibility and all aspects of road safety. Potential areas we are looking at include testing and verification technology, crash avoidance technology, injury mitigation technology (in event of crash), social reintegration technology (which refers to smart first response and rehabilitation technology), and management and strategic planning technology.
The Ministry of Environment and Water presented the National Green Technology Innovation Roadmap, which aims to leverage green technology innovation for an environmentally sustainable Malaysia by 2030. Sectoral innovations under this roadmap include government green procurement, smart grid technology, green industrial process, IoT river monitoring, Waste to Energy and Wealth schemes, application of smart and green buildings, energy efficiency vehicles & electric vehicles, vertical & urban farming, and IoT forest monitoring.
Lastly, but not least, in line with behavioural changes due to COVID-19, I asked MOSTI to prepare a paper on Low-Touch Infrastructure and Economic Initiatives. These will require a paradigm shift in how we look interact both with each other and the world around us. Some of the low-touch initiatives we have quickly identified include autonomous floor scrubbers, autonomous power assist robots (to carry your goods) and smart waste management systems in public markets. We’ve also launched robotics in hospitals together with MOH, and robotics, drones and artificial intelligence modules in plantations together with FELDA. Some of these initiatives will be realised via the National Technology & Innovation Sandbox.
Many of these programmes, roadmaps, and policies have existed and been implemented in silos by different ministries and agencies. This is just the start of how we relook at the development and application of technology in this country, to ensure everything is in line with our national needs and part of a coherent whole.
KHAIRY JAMALUDDIN
MINISTER OF SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION
18 DECEMBER 2020
the council for science and technology 在 堅離地城:沈旭暉國際生活台 Simon's Glos World Facebook 的最佳解答
【#TheDiplomat: 沈旭暉隨緣家書英文版🇭🇰】很久沒有向國際關係評論網 The Diplomat 供稿,但國際線十分重要,不應放棄。這次他們希望分享23條、國安法、反恐法風雨欲來的「新香港」前瞻,願國際社會能多了解快將出現的危機:
While the world is preoccupied with a fight against the COVID-19 pandemic, Beijing has been tightening its political grip on all aspects of Hong Kong’s civil society. Rumor has it that Beijing will push through legislating national security laws under Article 23 of Hong Kong’s Basic Law by unconventional means, such as massively disqualifying pro-democratic legislators or even directly applying a national law, widely argued as a major step to destroy the rights and freedom of Hong Kongers, and bring Chinese authoritarianism to Hong Kong.
After the 2019 protests, the administration of Carrie Lam, who theoretically is still leading the special administrative region of China, has little political capital at stake, with its legitimacy reaching rock bottom. The pro-government camp has dwindling prospects for the city’s upcoming Legislative Council election. The government‘s ”nothing to lose“ mentality is apparent from its recent blatant reinterpretation of the Basic Law’s Article 22 (another article that limits the influence of China’s offices in Hong Kong’s internal affairs). The debate is nothing new, but the pressure this time is quite different.
This article highlights the different strategies Beijing could adopt to enact Article 23 insidiously or under disguise to avoid backlash from the international community, while continuing to reap benefits from the city’s globally recognized special status. This seems to be part of Beijing’s brinkmanship to bring Hong Kong protesters and their supporters to their knees and move the city closer to authoritarianism. To counter these moves, Hong Kongers must define the boundaries beyond which Hong Kong falls into authoritarian rule and make a case as to why the city’s downfall is detrimental to the international community‘s interest.
The Long-Term Controversy Over National Security Laws
Back in 2003, the implementation of Article 23 was thwarted by the moderate pro-establishment politician James Tien. In face of overwhelming public disapproval of the law, he withdrew support and votes from his Liberal Party. However, 17 years later, it is hard to imagine Beijing following the old legislative playbook: start with a public consultation, followed by public discourse and political debate, and end with the majority rule. This playbook only works in peaceful societies ruled by a trustworthy government with integrity.
The aftermath of 2003, as well as the 2019 protests, should have taught Beijing and the Hong Kong government a lesson: pushing through national security legislation in a flawed parliament controlled by the minority pro-government camp would inevitably set off another full city-scale protest — and undoubtedly more fierce and focused this time. Given the current government’s numerous displays of dishonesty, it is conceivable that they will embark on a less-traveled path to implement Article 23.
Strategy One: “Anti-Terrorism”
In principle, one possible strategy could be to directly enact Chinese national law across Hong Kong, which can be achieved by declaring a state of emergency in the city. However, this is risky business as it would tarnish the integrity of “one country two systems” and subsequently Hong Kong’s international standing. Beijing, a risk-averse regime, is also unwilling to see Hong Kong’s status as a middleman for laundering money disappear into thin air.
Instead, Beijing could be concocting a narrative that would see Chinese national law applied to Hong Kong while not damaging Hong Kong’s international standing and Beijing’s own interests. The key word in this script is “anti-terrorism.” As early as 2014, pro-Beijing scholars have been claiming the emergence of “local terrorist ideology” on Hong Kong soil. Since the anti-extradition bill protests last year, government rhetoric frequently described the protests, which caused no deaths at all in the entire year, with phrases like “inclination to terrorist ideology.” That was a signal to the world that Hong Kong’s internal conflicts had ballooned into a national security issue. This gives the government the legitimacy to justify the implementation of Chinese national laws across the highly autonomous region to counter terrorism. The Chinese government knows that if it can persuade the world that terrorism exists in Hong Kong, and that it is as severe as the terror threat facing many other nations today, the international community will be less critical of Beijing’s actions in Hong Kong. Enacting Chinese laws directly is a convenient path that will save Beijing from having to tackle Hong Kong’s internal conflicts, basically turning the Hong Kong issue into a nonissue.
Strategy Two: Stacking the Legislature by Disqualifying Candidates
An even bolder strategy was probably foretold by a recent incident where the Hong Kong government and Beijing’s agencies for Hong Kong affairs (HKMAO and the Liaison Office) jointly criticized lawmaker Dennis Kwok for filibustering, framing it as “misconduct in public office” and “violating his oath.” It is incomprehensible to claim that filibustering goes against a lawmaker’s main duty; rather, it is common understanding that legislative work includes debating the law and representing public opinion against unreasonable laws. In a parliament controlled by the minority, pro-democratic members representing the majority of Hong Kongers are forced to express their objections using means like filibustering. Wouldn’t a lack of different political opinions turn the legislative branch into a rubber-stamp institution?
The above allegation has set a dangerous precedent for twisting the logic behind a certain provision in the Basic Law to target opposing lawmakers. In other words, to fulfill Beijing’s interpretation of the principal requirement for holding public office in Hong Kong, one could be required to take a meticulously legalistic approach to uphold the Basic Law down to its every single wording. A public official, by this new definition, not only needs to support “one country, two systems” or object Hong Kong independence, but also must abide by every single provision in the Basic Law. Worst of all, based on the previous cases, whether an official’s words or actions oversteps a provision is up to Beijing’s interpretation of his/her “intent.”
If this approach is applied, in the next election, there might be additional official questions for screening candidates like the following: “The Basic Law states that the enactment of Article 23 is a constitutional duty. Failing to support Article 23 legislation violates the Basic Law. Do you support it?” This question would suffice to disqualify even moderate or even pro-establishment candidates like James Tien. Even if any pro-democratic candidates were elected, once Article 23 re-enters the legislative process, they could risk ouster by raising objections.
Despite the absurdity of this tactic, the Chinese regime may just be tempted enough if such a strategy could resolve two of China’s current nuisances — voices of dissent in the Legislative Council and the previous failure to implement Article 23.
Strategy Three: The “Boiling Frog Effect”
Article 23 is not yet implemented, but the dystopian world that the protesters pictured in 2003 is already becoming reality. Regular citizens have been persecuted for “sedition” for sharing their views on social media or participating in legal protests; workers face retaliation for taking part in strikes; corporations are pressured to publicly side with the government’s stance; employees who have the “wrong” political views are fired; schools have been closely monitored for teaching material; protest-supporting fundraisers were framed for money laundering; a retweet or like may lead to persecution, under a colonial-era law. Only now have Hong Kongers woken up to their new reality — although the Basic Law technically protects citizens’ rights to speak, rally, march, demonstrate, and go on strike, the government could enfeeble civil rights by bending antiquated laws and legal provisions. The frequent abuse of law enforcement power on a small scale, such as improper arrests and police violence, is desensitizing the public and the international community. In a few years, Hong Kong will become unrecognizable. This is indeed a clever play on Beijing’s part to slowly strip away Hong Kong’s autonomy and freedom, without causing much international attention.
Counter-Strategies Against Beijing’s Brinkmanship
Beijing’s overarching goal is to hollow out Hong Kong but, at the same time, avoid major backlash from the international community, which could spell the end of the privileged global status of Hong Kong not granted to other Chinese cities. Beijing also aims at preventing single incidents that could cascade down into mass protests as seen in 2003, 2014, and 2019; and eliminating any resistance forces from within Hong Kong’s legislature. The tactics outlined above are typical in a game of brinkmanship.
In response, Hong Kongers in Hong Kong and on the so-called “international frontline” must know their strengths and bargaining chips on this negotiating table with Beijing.
Unlike Xinjiang and Tibet, Hong Kong is a city with transparency and free flow of information. Hong Kongers need to make a case to the world that the protests are not acts of terrorism. Some suggestions include comparing the Hong Kong protests to similar struggles in 20 or so other counties in the world at the present time, none of which were classified as terrorism; collecting a large amount of concrete evidence of the disproportionate use of force by the Hong Kong police; and showing how enacting Chinese national laws in Hong Kong will end the city’s autonomy and spell disaster for international community‘s interests.
The Legislative Council is the institution that can counteract Beijing’s “boiling frog” strategy and to keep Hong Kongers’ hope alive in the system. Those who plan to run for legislative office must be prepared to be disqualified from running. If only individuals are banned, there need to be alternative candidates as back-up plans. However, if and when the disqualification process is applied broadly to entire camps of candidates (for example, all who object to Article 23), the pro-democracy camp must make a strong case to the Hong Kong and global public that this is the endgame for Hong Kong democracy. Then the incumbent popularly elected legislators will hold the internationally recognized mandate from the public and serve as the last resistance.
These recommendations delineates how the slogan “if we burn, you burn with us,” often seen in the protests, may play out in the game of international relations. If the national security laws are “passed” by a legislature that is jury-rigged in this manner, or if related national laws are directly implemented in Hong Kong, Hong Kongers should signal clearly to the world that it goes way beyond the promised “one country, two systems.” Crossing this red line by Beijing should be seen by the world as a blunt violation of its promised autonomy to Hong Kongers. At that time, if the international community led by the United States and the United Kingdom decided to revoke the “non-sovereignty entity” status of Hong Kong and regard the SAR as an ordinary Chinese city, it shouldn’t come as a surprise.
Dr. Simon Shen is the Founding Chairman of GLOs (Glocal Learning Offices), an international relations start-up company. He also serves as an adjunct associate professor in the University of Hong Kong, Chinese University of Hong Kong and the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and associate director of the Master of Global Political Economy Programme of the CUHK. The author acknowledges Jean Lin, Coco Ho, Chris Wong, Michelle King, and Alex Yap for their assistance in this piece.
▶️ 高度自治 vs 全面管治
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pwt8wZl8jHQ
the council for science and technology 在 channelvtc Youtube 的最佳解答
Prepare Students to Become Future Engineering Specialists
The Vocational Baccalaureate (VB) Programme (Engineering) covers practical modules in engineering science, mechanical principles and industrial robot technology. Coupled with industry projects and visits, students will be equipped with specialised knowledge, analytical and problem solving skills to be a future engineering professional.
Taking English as the medium of instruction, the broad-based curriculum of VB Programmes covers language and numeric studies at IGCSE level and vocational modules adopted from the BTEC Level 3 Extended Diploma, building a solid foundation for further studies locally/overseas as well as a professional career ahead.
裝備學生成為未來工程專才
職專國際課程(工程)涵蓋工程科學、機械原理、機械人科技等專業範疇。配以實用專題研習以及行業參觀,鞏固學生的專業知識、分析和解難能力,裝備他們成為未來工程專才。
職專國際課程以英語授課及評核,全面課程設計廣泛涵蓋IGCSE水平語文及數學,並採用BTEC第三級延伸文憑之專業範疇單元,為本地/海外升學及專業發展打好基礎。
For more details更多詳情: http://bit.ly/VB-Engine-19